# Round Report vs. St. Ignatius PL – Umich Round 4

# 1nc

## shunning

#### Mexico is a flagrant violator of human rights.

HRW 13 — Human Rights Watch, 2013 (“Mexico,” 2013 World Report, Available Online at http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/mexico?page=1, Accessed 07-22-2013)

Mexican security forces have committed widespread human rights violations in efforts to combat powerful organized crime groups, including killings, disappearances, and torture. Almost none of these abuses are adequately investigated, exacerbating a climate of violence and impunity in many parts of the country.¶ In an historic decision in August 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that the use of military jurisdiction to prosecute a human rights violation was unconstitutional. Nonetheless, most abuses by military personnel continue to be prosecuted in military courts, which lack independence and impartiality.¶ Criminal groups and members of security forces continue to threaten or attack human rights defenders and journalists. The government has failed to provide these vulnerable groups with adequate protection or investigate the crimes committed against them. In April, Mexico passed legislation to create a protection mechanism for human rights defenders and journalists, but protocols to evaluate risk and assign protection are still being designed.

#### Reject engagement with human rights abusers — *moral duty* to shun.

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict.¶ But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions?¶ We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order.¶ Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in.¶ Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order.¶ An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this?¶ First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.)¶ Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force."¶ Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it.¶ Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. ¶ We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have an obligation to shun in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as tacit complicity in the willful, persistent, and flagrant immorality.

## T-EE

**Economic engagement is a long-term strategy that promotes structural linkage between two economies – plan doesn’t do either**

**Mastanduno, 1** – professor of Government at Dartmouth College (Michael, “Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice” <http://web.archive.org/web/20120906033646/http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mastanduno.pdf>

The basic causal logic of economic engagement, and the emphasis on domestic politics, can be traced to Hirschman. He viewed economic engagement as a **long-term, transformative strategy**. As one state gradually expands economic interaction with its target, the resulting (asymmetrical) interdependence creates vested interests within the target society and government. The beneficiaries of interdependence become addicted to it, and they protect their interests by pressuring the government to accommodate the source of interdependence. **Economic engagement is a form of structural linkage**; it is a means to get other states to *want* what you want, rather than to *do* what you want. The causal chain runs from economic interdependence through domestic political change to foreign policy accommodation.

**That’s a voter for limits – broad interpretations of engagement include anything that effects the economy, which means everything**

**Good is not good enough – precise definition outweighs**

**Resnick 01** – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a **precondition for effective policymaking**. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an **erratic, ad hoc fashion** risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error **undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research**. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they **undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy**.

## CP

#### CP Text: The United States federal government should enter into prior binding consultation with the relevant indigenous peoples of [Mexico] over [entrance into the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership]. The United States will advocate [entrance into the Transatlantic Trade and Investment partnership] throughout the process of consultation and implement the result.

#### Prior consultation with Latin American indigenous peoples over engagement is critical to avert cultural and physical annihilation

Kinnison, 11 – (Akilah Jenga Kinnison, J.D. Candidate, University of Arizona College of Law. 2011. “INDIGENOUS CONSENT: RETHINKING U.S. CONSULTATION POLICIES IN LIGHT OF THE U.N. DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,” http://www.arizonalawreview.org/pdf/53-4/53arizlrev1301.pdf)//SDL

¶ Due to the nature of large-scale extractive activities, there seems to be a ¶ ¶ shift in the international arena toward viewing states’ duty to consult with ¶ ¶ indigenous peoples as falling on the consent end of the consultation–consent ¶ ¶ spectrum. Some argue that, where activities directly impact indigenous peoples’ ¶ ¶ right to “use, enjoy, control, and develop their traditional lands,” there is a norm ¶ ¶ developing that recognizes that full consent, rather than just meaningful ¶ ¶ consultation, is required.206 For instance, former Special Rapporteur on the ¶ ¶ Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People ¶ ¶ Rodolfo Stavenhagen has stated that “the free, informed and prior consent, as ¶ ¶ well as the right to self-determination of indigenous communities and peoples, ¶ ¶ must be considered as a necessary precondition” for “major development projects” ¶ ¶ affecting indigenous lands.207 Such “major development projects” include “the ¶ ¶ large scale exploitation of natural resources including subsoil resources.”208 ¶ ¶ Stavenhagen has argued that indigenous peoples have the “right to say no” to ¶ ¶ certain development projects.¶ ¶ Furthermore, there are strong arguments for why, even if such a norm has ¶ ¶ not yet crystallized, states should adopt this interpretation of FPIC for large-scale ¶ ¶ extractive activities. First, the power to withhold consent can be seen as necessary ¶ ¶ to enforce other important indigenous rights beyond rights of consultation and ¶ ¶ participation.210 This is particularly true in the context of extractive industries, ¶ ¶ whose projects implicate numerous other indigenous rights due to their ability to ¶ ¶ threaten indigenous peoples’ physical and cultural survival.211 For instance, the ¶ ¶ ability to withhold consent allows indigenous communities to enforce their ¶ ¶ community property rights, protect their sacred spaces, and maintain their culture ¶ ¶ and relationship with the land. ¶ Additionally, there are reservations about how “meaningful” indigenous ¶ ¶ participation can be in the absence of the power to withhold consent.212 As ¶ ¶ Professor Brant McGee comments: “Absent the ability to walk away from the ¶ ¶ bargaining table, indigenous groups would simply be participating in a ¶ ¶ meaningless exchange of views designed to fulfill a legal requirement.”213 Given ¶ ¶ the stakes and zero-sum potential of large-scale extractive projects, “[t]here is no ¶ ¶ such thing as partial consent in this context.”¶ ¶ 214 Therefore, indigenous peoples ¶ ¶ must be equipped with the ability to withhold consent in order to engage in ¶ ¶ meaningful negotiation. Special Rapporteur Anaya has stated: “[T]he principles of ¶ ¶ consultation and consent are aimed at avoiding the imposition of the will of one ¶ ¶ party over the other, and . . . instead striving for mutual understanding and ¶ ¶ consensual decision-making.”215 Yet without the power to withhold consent in ¶ ¶ zero-sum situations where destructive impacts on indigenous lands and culture are ¶ ¶ high, indigenous people are left with little bargaining power and therefore may be ¶ ¶ unable to participate in meaningful consultation. ¶ Promoting an interpretation of FPIC that gives indigenous peoples the ¶ ¶ right to withhold consent in the context of large-scale extractive projects is also ¶ ¶ good policy from the state and corporate perspectives because it can make projects ¶ ¶ more successful. Professor Lisa J. Laplante and attorney Suzanne A. Spears ¶ ¶ propose that extractive industries can diffuse costly opposition to projects by ¶ ¶ engaging in community “consent processes.”216 Conflicts with communities can create obstacles for a particular project as well as for the corporation itself.217 ¶ ¶ Global campaigns against particular companies have been waged—as exemplified ¶ ¶ by “ProtestBarrick.net,” which is a campaign entirely devoted to publicizing ¶ ¶ opposition to Barrick Gold Corporation.218 Such campaigns can damage a ¶ ¶ company’s reputation, which Laplante and Spears refer to as “an extractive ¶ ¶ industry company’s lifeblood.”219 Additionally, opposition can be costly due to the ¶ ¶ public relations campaigns corporations must launch in response to community ¶ ¶ opposition,220 legal costs to fend off efforts to shut down projects, and losses in ¶ ¶ profitability. For example, after the ¶ ¶ Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a limited ¶ ¶ injunction against Barrick in the Cortez Hills case, the company’s stock dropped ¶ ¶ 8.43%, despite the fact that the project did not ultimately shut down.¶ Thus, when states believe a development project is in the public interest, ¶ ¶ they should seek to engage the community in consent processes, rather than ¶ ¶ consultation processes, both to protect the rights of indigenous peoples and also to ¶ ¶ promote the long-term benefit of the project itself. As Laplante and Spears ¶ ¶ explained: ¶ Whereas consultation processes require only that extractive industry ¶ ¶ companies [or the state] hear the views of those potentially affected ¶ ¶ by a project and then take them into account when engaging in ¶ ¶ decision-making processes, consent processes require that host ¶ ¶ communities actually participate in decision-making processes. ¶ ¶ Consent processes give affected communities the leverage to ¶ ¶ negotiate mutually acceptable agreements under which projects may ¶ ¶ proceed¶ Interpreting FPIC as respecting the right of indigenous peoples to withhold consent ¶ ¶ for large-scale extractive projects, therefore, gives communities the tools necessary ¶ ¶ to protect their rights as well as to bargain with state and corporate actors in order ¶ ¶ to move forward with development projects on mutually beneficial terms. ¶ In sum, within the context of large-scale extractive industries, it is in the ¶ ¶ best interest of states to take a consent-based approach to operationalizing the ¶ ¶ principle of FPIC found in instruments such as the U.N. Declaration. ¶ The United States has articulated a commitment to the importance of ¶ ¶ indigenous consultation both through its endorsement of the U.N. Declaration on ¶ ¶ the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and its domestic policies, such as E.O. 13,175 ¶ ¶ and President Obama’s Tribal Consultation Memorandum. However, in order to ¶ ¶ fully realize this commitment, the United States should embrace a policy shift away from the currently articulated meaningful consultation standard. U.S. law and policy should move toward viewing indigenous consultation as involving a spectrum of requirements—with good-faith, meaningful consultation as a minimum and with consent required in certain contexts, including large-scale extractive industries.

#### Cultural Genocide

Smith, 6 – (Andrea, Assistant Professor of Media and Cultural Studies at UC Riverside, Appropriation of Native American Religious Traditions, Encyclopedia of Women and Religion in North America, Vol. 1, pg. 104-105)

Native spiritualities are land based — they are tied to the landbase from which they originate. When Native peoples fight for cultural/spiritual preservation, they are ultimately fighting for the landbase which grounds their spirituality and culture. For this reason, Native religions are generally not proselytizing. They are typically seen by Native peoples as relevant only to the particular landbase from which they originate; they are not necessarily applicable to peoples coming from different landbases. In addition, as many scholars have noted, Native religions are practice centered rather than belief centered. That is, Christianity is defined by belief in a certain set of doctrinal principles about Jesus, the Bible, etc. Evangelical Christianity holds that one is “saved” when one professes belief in Jesus Christ as one’s Lord and Savior. But what is of primary important in Native religions is not being able to articulate belief in a certain set of doctrines, but being able to take part in the spiritual practice of one’s community. In fact, it may be more important that a ceremony be done correctly than it is for everyone in that ceremony to know exactly why everything must be done in a certain way. As Vine Deloria (Dakota) notes, from a Native context, religion is “a way of life” rather than “a matter of proper exposition of doctrines.” Even if Christians do not have access to church, they continue to be Christians as long as they believe in Jesus. Native spiritualities, by contrast, may die if the people do not practice the ceremonies, even if the people continue to believe in their power. Native communities argue that Native peoples cannot be alienated from their land without committing cultural genocide. This argument underpins many sacred sites cases, although usually to no avail, before the courts. Most of the court rulings on sacred sites do not recognize this difference between belief-centered and practice-centered traditions or the significance of land-based spiritualities. For instance, in Fools Crow v. Gullet (1983), the Supreme Court ruled against the Lakota who were trying to halt the development of additional tourist facilities in the Black Hills. The Court ruled that this tourism was not an infringement on Indian religious freedom because, although it would hinder the ability of the Lakota to practice their beliefs, it did not force them to relinquish their beliefs. For the Lakota, however, stopping the practice of traditional beliefs destroys the belief systems themselves. Consequently, for the Lakota and Native nations in general, cultural genocide is the result when Native landbases are not protected. When we disconnect Native spiritual practices from their land bases, we undermine Native peoples’ claim that the protection of the land base is integral to the survival of Native peoples and hence undermine their claims to sovereignty. This practice of disconnecting Native spirituality from its land base is prevalent in a wide variety of practices of cultural and spiritual appropriation, from New Agers claiming to be Indian in a former life to Christians adopting Native spiritual forms to further their missionizing efforts. The message is that anyone can practice Indian spirituality anywhere. Hence there is no need to protect the specific Native communities and the lands that are the basis of their spiritual practices.

#### Extinction – each loss contributes to an invisible threshold

Stavenhagen, 90 – (Rodolfo, Professor @ the United Nations University, The Ethnic Question pg. 73)

The struggle for the preservation of the collective identity of culturally distinct peoples has further implications as well. The cultural diversity of the world’s peoples is a universal resource for all humankind. The diversity of the worlds cultural pool is like the diversity of the world’s biological gene pool. A culture that disappears due to ethnocide or cultural genocide represents a loss for all humankind. At a time when the classic development models of the post war era have failed to solve the major problems of mankind, people are again looking at so called traditional cultures for at least some of the answers. This is very clear, for example, as regards to agricultural and food production, traditional medicine, environmental management in rural areas, construction techniques, social solidarity in times of crises, etc. The world’s diverse cultures have much to offer our imperiled planet. Thus the defense of the collective rights of ethnic groups and indigenous peoples cannot be separated from the collective human rights of all human beings.

## K

#### Economic Engagement with Latin America authorizes international violence while criminalizing dissent – the 1AC exhibits a discourse of security that provides the rationale for global domination.

Figueredo 7 [Darío Salinas, Professor in the Graduate Program in Social Sciences at the Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City, specialist in Latin American Studies at the CONACYT National System of Researchers, Latin American Perspectives, Issue 152, Vol. 34 No. 1, January, “Hegemony in the Coordinates of U.S. Policy: Implications for Latin America,” Translated by Marlene Medrano, p. 95-98]

The mobilization of an external threat, real or fictitious, and the belief in its intrinsic superiority have historically been important aspects of the discourse of U.S. policy, from the notion of the “savage” Native Americans to the Monroe Doctrine and the postulates of Manifest Destiny to the Huntingtonian elaboration that, by stressing cultural differences, suggests the capacity to harbor in its historical mission the germ of a “superior culture.”¶ After 1989, U.S. hegemony, in its search for a redefinition of the enemy, found in terrorism the threat it required to further its policy. The construction of this threat has not been free of inaccuracies and exaggerations. The most blatant example is that of the “weapons of mass destruction” supposedly in the hands of the deposed Baghdad regime, which, according to Washington, represented a real threat to U.S. security but which turned out to exist only in the political laboratory of the presidential team.¶ The new geostrategic order is overwhelmingly unilateral from the point of view of the political-military, financial, and technological power of the United States. The emergent polarities are fragmented and barely sketch a relative economic and commercial hierarchy, especially with regard to China, Japan, and Germany. At the same time, various indicators suggest a decline in the U.S. economy. The dynamic of these changes has important consequences for the conceptualization of the security issue.¶ During the cold war, “security” meant the traditional “state security.” It consisted of the perception of threats superimposed on the identification of internal conflicts that were treated as “subversive threats” supported from outside. Schematically, this was the general logic of the hegemonic notion of security that involved the “containment of communism” as an ideology. A political framework referred to as “national security doctrine” served as a model for the conduct of the majority of Latin American governments. The hypothesis of “civil war,” which gave rise to the “fight against subversion,” justified the installation or survival of dictatorships.¶ Recently, others attempting to identify structural causes for the conflicts that threaten security have revised this conceptualization. The context for this redefinition is globalization and its implication of interdependence. It is in this context that we can situate terrorism as a “global threat” articulated as a component of a security policy.¶ Finally, the transition to democracy has not resulted in a substantial restructuring of the armed forces. Despite the beneficent dimensions of the political changes in terms of human rights and a democratic rearrangement of the civil-military relationship (Tulchin, 2002), there is no indication of a significant change in the doctrinal framework that guided the actions of the armed forces up to the 1980s. Although there is no homogeneity within military institutions, a conceptual and doctrinal framework is maintained as a general rule. This is an advantage for the new security strategy connected with the fight against terrorism, given that its conception continues to be part of its capacity to control the conduct of others—in other words, to orchestrate its hegemony.¶ FREE TRADE AND SECURITY¶ The post–cold-war period has been characterized by the indisputable dominance of financial capital in the development of the global economy. The free circulation of unrestricted capital constitutes the motor of the model. The globalization of markets involves privatization and deregulation of the international financial system on a primarily speculative basis. The movement of international capital has been freed from the variables of the economy whose operation remained largely beyond the control of the national authorities in charge of economic policy, variables that Treasury secretaries often refer to in terms of a “difficult environment.” The proposal to transform the Latin American region into a free-trade zone is a reflection of this climate that, since 1989 and especially since the Washington Consensus, has been deployed as the ideology of neoliberalism and then as a policy converted into action (Cademartori, 2004).¶ In fact, U.S. conceptions of security and economic-commercial policy constitute an integrated geostrategic whole; the expansion of global commerce is part of the security strategy of the United States (Salinas, 2002). The project is aimed at standardizing the development of the world in terms of criteria that favor the economic-political configuration of the principal world power (Chossudovsky, 2002). Proposals of integration are not related exclusively to commercial issues. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which should not be considered abandoned, and other free-trade treaties should be considered geopolitical mechanisms for developing a large-scale project of domination. These mechanisms range from the strictly economic to those concerning labor legislation, state reform, laws concerning intellectual property, the environment, natural and energy resources, knowledge, and culture. The free-trade treaties signed so far, Chile’s among them, endorse the totalizing character intended by Washington and Wall Street (Weintraub and Prado, 2005).¶ It is exactly from this angle that the core of this geostrategic conception can be appraised. Its most acute expression was in the formulation of the concept of the “preventive war,” which in the case of Iraq was carried out at the margins of international legality, confirming the unilateralism that is fundamental to decision making in the new geostrategic order.¶ Antiterrorist policy operates as a coercive force that has an impact on regimes whose margins of self-determination are most precarious. The comprehensive treatment of these challenges is expressed in the context of the fragmentation of Latin American foreign policy in the face of the pragmatic U.S. prioritization of drug trafficking, terrorism, and migration.¶ Since 9/11 the United States has attempted to implement its national security policy without much concern for the establishment of agreements. This course of action was ratified both in the Conference on Hemispheric Security in 2003 and in the meeting of secretaries of defense in 2004. Lack of concordance in the treatment of an agenda shared with the United States necessarily turns into a sounding board for a social and political imbalance that disturbs more than the surface of diplomacy. This may be responsible for the strong social pressure to reconsider military spending in the countries of Latin America given their serious deficiencies with regard to social welfare, stability, and security. In the face of this deficit, the significance of military spending as a percentage of the global product since 2001 cannot be overlooked (IISS, 2004).¶ For Latin America, a security setting excluding the United States would be unthinkable. It is appropriate, then, to identify some complications associated with this problem.¶ 1. If the principle of dissuasion no longer seems useful in the struggle against terrorism, it is clear that, despite the prioritization of military force, a policy of alliance is required. In this sense, Latin America is an essential area for the United States because of the importance of its “great southern border.” The historical influence of the United States in the area, beyond its actual strategic supremacy and the agreements already subscribed to, is the best breeding ground for a campaign in favor of validation of the concept of security embodied in the policy of “preventive war.” The demand for collaboration stems from its imperative character, which does not admit different views because those who are not friends are enemies.¶ 2. Multilateralism has lost its force, and its political-diplomatic tools have been debilitated. Although there is no concerted regional capacity to avoid the imposition of unilateralism, countertrends and doubts are arising that release new forms of interaction and collaboration, primarily in the Andes and South America (Rojas, 2003).¶ 3. The sovereignty of the other loses its legitimacy if there is a presumption in the North that under its protection terrorism is being covered up or supported or if there is suspicion concerning the construction of weapons of mass destruction. From this perspective, one of the principal dangers for the security of Latin America stems not from foreign armies or from guerrillas but from criminal organizations. The danger of this perspective is the possibility of criminalizing the social struggle that has been unleashed in the region.¶ 4. The limits of the policy have opened a space for the absolutization of “hard power”—in other words, military force—in the new model and the antiterrorist struggle. From a Latin American viewpoint, security requires a multidimensional reading that transcends the view entailed by that struggle.¶ The significance for U.S. policy assumed by the struggle against terrorism as a “war of global reach” or a “global enterprise of uncertain duration” is inseparable from the previous points (NSC, 2002). These statements are translated into the identification of threats or zones of threat in Latin America as follows:¶ 1. The “triple border” of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, which has long been a path for unregulated trade on a grand scale—in other words, for contraband of all types. Similar cases include the Tabatinga-Leticia corridor on the Brazilian border with Colombia, the Lake Agrio zone between Ecuador and Colombia, and the Darien Jungle.¶ 2. The current government of Venezuela, because of its alleged support of the Colombian guerrillas and for setting a bad political example for the region as a whole. Its economic and political initiatives potentially constitute expressions of a counter-balance to hegemonic politics, which may explain the intrusive and destabilizing harassment to which it is subject.¶ 3. The Cuban government, for its alleged support of international terrorism and the meaning of its politics.¶ 4. “Latin American terrorist organizations,” among them the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army in addition to drug traffickers and paramilitaries. This point implicates Colombia and its neighboring countries, along with the Caribbean basin, as an extraordinarily significant area for U.S. security policy. The U.S. resources destined for Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative and a sordid struggle for the drug market, added to the climate of war and violence, reflect a situation with the capacity to produce dynamics that unbalance the strategic perspective of regional stability.

#### Authorizes limitless global destruction.

Der Derian 98 (James, Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts, On Security, Ed. Lipschutz, p. 24-25)

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... [7](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0=www.ciaonet.org:80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note7) In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " [8](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0=www.ciaonet.org:80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note8) By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.

#### Reject the Aff’s discourse of international relations – abandoning the attempt to eradicate insecurity is a prerequisite to meaningful political engagement.

Neocleous 8 [Mark, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University, Critique of Security, p. 185-186]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security.¶ This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told – never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives.¶ Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths.¶ For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143

## Trade

**No protectionism and no impact**

**Anderson 9** — head of Asia-Pacific Economics for UBS (Jonathan, Reality Check for Prophets of Protectionism, 17 August 2009, http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009-08-17/110225722.html, AMiles)

Now, here we are again, at the beginning of what some commentators call the "Great Depression II." And according to the World Trade Organization, we are seeing a sharp uptick in protectionist measures around the world. Are we risking another wave of trade destruction that closes the world's doors? And could a new wave crush China and the rest of the emerging world? The short answer is no. We do not worry much about the protectionism issue. We think these fears are vastly overstated for four reasons. First, conditions in the global economy are not that bad. If we look back at the Great Depression in the 1930s, we find the United States economy contracted nearly 30 percent in real terms, and more than a quarter of the entire workforce was unemployed. Up to one-third of the economy simply disappeared. In many European economies, the impact was greater still. How do things look today? At last count, the United States, euro zone countries, and Japan had seen a cumulative GDP contraction of 6 percent or so, with average unemployment nearing 9 percent. And this is probably as bad as it will get; the world economy is now expected to stabilize and recover in the second half of 2009. Of course, the recovery may be extremely weak. But even if developed countries don't grow at all over the next 18 months, the situation still compares favorably with the events of 75 years ago. In other words, there's just no reason to look for the same kind of protectionist reaction today. We should add that we're not seeing it. The WTO has reported a sharp increase in various protectionist actions, claims and cases, but the overall economic impact of these measures is still small by any standard. This is likely to be the worst it will get. Second, the effects of "plain vanilla" protectionism are highly exaggerated. Although Smoot-Hawley passed in 1930, raising tariffs on thousands of products, most economists agree the real attack on global trade didn't come until the breakup of the international monetary and exchange rate arrangements in 1931, and a corresponding collapse of global finance. Of course, many pundits now worry about the fall of the U.S. dollar as a global invoicing and reserve currency, and that this could have a similarly negative impact on trade and financing. However, we should stress that as bad as the U.S. economy looks at present, it's still the best thing we have. The European Union is beset by crushing regional disparities and political pressures, with significant basket cases hiding inside its borders. Japan simply doesn't have the necessary dynamism or commitment to globalization. And as far as fiscal balance sheets are concerned, all three major regions have equally significant problems. The United States stands alone in terms of how fast the Federal Reserve has expanded its monetary balance sheet, raising specific concerns about U.S. inflation and its impact on the dollar. But as one can see by looking at U.S. economic data, we are still falling into a deflation cycle for the time being, with nary a hint of inflationary pressure yet. We fully expect the Fed to be able to rein in the monetary expansion quickly if these pressures arise. We should add that, although it's fashionable to look at China and the yuan as a rising competitor to the dollar, this is simply not a realistic theme for the next 10 years – and perhaps for much longer. China doesn't have an open capital account, which means there is little opportunity or interest in holding the yuan as a serious asset. If anything, the impact of the current global crisis is likely to convince mainland authorities to be slow in opening their borders. China also doesn't have the kind of deep, domestic financial markets required of a global reserve currency; the bond market in particular is still in its infancy. As a result, it will be a long time indeed before the yuan starts playing a real role on the global stage. Third, even if we do see an unexpected wave of protectionism, emerging countries have less to lose than the developed world. Let's start by asking this question: When we talk about "protectionism," what exactly are we trying to protect? The answer is, of course, domestic workers and domestic jobs. In what areas do the labor forces of the United States, Europe and Japan work? The vast majority are in services and construction, sectors that don't compete much directly on the international arena. Only 10 to 15 percent are manufacturing jobs, and these are mostly in capital intensive, high-tech industries such as autos, precision machinery and high-end electronics. By contrast, manufactured goods that China and other emerging markets sell – toys, textiles, running shoes, sporting goods, light electronics, etc. – are barely made at all in the G3 countries. Rich countries outsourced most of these low-end, labor-intensive jobs a long time ago. A related point holds for commodities and raw materials, which make up much of the rest of the exports from the low-income world. All three major, developed regions are heavily dependent on imported resources, and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The bottom line here is that even if we do get a big wave of protectionism in developed countries, it unlikely to be aimed specifically at low-end goods from the developed world. Rather, it makes more sense to protect the auto industry along with high-end equipment and chemical manufacturers. Moreover, any tariffs and barriers placed on toys and textiles are much more likely to raise consumer prices than crush volumes, given the absence of competitive domestic industries that could take advantage of protection to grab local market shares. The final point concerns financial leverage. There has never been a time in recent global economic history when the developed world was so dependent on low-income countries for financial resources. For the first time, the emerging world is a net financial creditor. Given the rapid expansion of public debts, the major developed countries are extremely interested in seeing China and other low-income countries continue to buy U.S. Treasuries, Japanese Government Bonds and various European debt instruments. The impact of a big, potential pullout from global bond markets actually could be much more negative than positive in terms of protecting domestic industries. So emerging markets now are in a much better bargaining position than at any time in the past. Protectionist fears are likely to continue to bother investors over the next year or two, and perhaps longer. But we don't think the real situation supports these fears.

**No failed states – their authors are alarmists**

**NAM, 11**

New America Media, the country's first and largest national collaboration and advocate of 2000 ethnic news organizations, founded by the nonprofit Pacific News Service in 1996; “Mexico and the Myth of the ‘Failed State’,” 7/9/2011, http://newamericamedia.org/2011/07/mexico-and-the-myth-of-the-failed-state.php //bghs-ms

MERIDA, Mexico— For more than four decades, Americans have expressed alarm at what they see the imminent collapse of the Mexican government, warning their fellow citizens that Mexico is a “failed state.” But far from being a “failed state,” Mexico is proving itself to be one of the most successful countries in the world, one that has made the transition from an agrarian economy to a modern industrialized one, while moving from a closed, authoritarian regime to a vibrant democracy. Far too many Americans make the mistake of thinking Mexico as the country portrayed in the 1950s. Over the past half century, it has become one of the most important economies in the world. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the CIA World Factbook each rank Mexico as the 14th largest economy. Mexico has one of the most comprehensive social welfare programs anywhere in the hemisphere. This is a country that strives, albeit imperfectly and not always successfully, to provide for the general well-being. Yes, given its resources and its population, many people fall between the cracks. Of Mexico’s population of 110 million, some 30 million, or a little over a quarter, are living in the “informal economy,” as it is euphemistically called. For comparative purposes, 1.5 in 10 Americans rely on food stamps, and in the largest American city, New York, 1 in 4 children live below the federal poverty line. No country addresses all of the needs of its people, but Mexico is diligent in at least working towards that end. If you think that Mexico is a country with no laws or legal institutions, a kind of place reminiscent of some Hollywood movie where it’s the “Wild, Wild West,” then you are in for a surprise. Mexico is one of the most bureaucratic nations in the hemisphere—it rivals France when it comes to official paperwork! And it rivals the Scandinavian countries when it comes to its aspirations for being a “nanny state.” In fact, international agencies—from the World Bank to the International Monetary Fund—continue to remind Mexico that it has to “streamline” its bureaucracy if it wants to become more competitive in the global economy. Americans, however, are reluctant to give Mexico credit where credit is due. The myth of Mexico as a “failed state” began with Barry Goldwater, who lamented that the 1968 Summer Olympic Games were being held in Mexico City, the capital of what he called a “faltering” nation. Since then, Americans have discovered that Mexico-bashing is a sure way of making a quick buck on trash books. “This is an attempt to understand Mexico's steep descent into turmoil,” is how Andres Oppenheimer’s 1998 book, Bordering on Chaos, was marketed. Less than two years later, Mexico made a peaceful transition for a single-party state to a full democracy by electing its first opposition leader in seven decades. According to American commentators, a decade later, Mexico is still on the “verge” of collapsing. “The [Mexican] state has not yet taken control of drug trafficking, and its strength is steadily diminishing,” is George Grayson’s 1999 take in his book, “Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?” The book claimed to document “state disintegration.” And the news media continues to feed a constant stream of “failed state” alarmism. From the Wall Street Journal to National Public Radio, Americans are told of Mexico’s impending collapse. Joel Kurtzman warned in the Journal in 2009 that: “Mexico is at risk of becoming a failed state. Defense planners liken the situation to that of Pakistan, where wholesale collapse of civil government is possible.”

#### Turn – U.S.-EU cooperation causes terrorist attacks on US soil

COG 3/3/08 – (Bob Thiel, “A Combined EU & North American Trade Block Coming?”, Church of God News, http://www.cogwriter.com/news/prophecy/a-combined-eu-north-american-trade-block-coming/)//javi

However, over time, it will become increasingly clear that the British will be in more agreement with the Canadians and Americans and that the European Union in more agreement with the Mexicans than the EU will have with the English-speaking nations. Trade wars and/or serious trade disputes will most likely arise. The Brits will ultimately decide that they are more supportive of the Americans and Canadians. They will be so much more supportive that they will end up in a trading agreement with them (with the Australians and New Zealanders probably also becoming part of that agreement). The EU will decide that Mexico and the rest of Latin America are in more agreement with it and thus make some type of serious trading agreement with most (or all) of Latin America. The Vatican will also have influence here as Latin America is highly Roman Catholic. The Europeans and Americans, however, will continue to have military agreements, though many will be tense about them. Eventually, the Europeans (possibly under the cover of pretending that they are involved in a “NATO-like” exercise in North America) will eventually launch a surprise attack against the United States in fulfillment of both biblical and Catholic prophecies. The Mexicans will most likely be allied with the Europeans for this to happen.

#### That causes the U.S. lash out, precipitating global war

\*terrorist attacks will increase nationalism and cause US lashout

Schwartz-Morgan ‘1 Nicole, Assistant Professor of Politics and Economics at Royal Military College of Canada, 10/10/2001, “Wild Globalization and Terrorism,” http://www.wfs.org/mmmorgan.htm

The terrorist act can reactivate atavistic defense mechanisms which drive us to gather around clan chieftans. Nationalistic sentiment re-awakens, setting up an implacable frontier which divides "us" from "them," each group solidifying its cohesion in a rising hate/fear of the other group. (Remember Yugoslavia?) To be sure, the allies are trying for the moment to avoid the language of polarization, insisting that "this is not a war," that it is "not against Islam," "civilians will not be targeted." But the word "war" was pronounced, a word heavy with significance which forces the issue of partisanship. And it must be understood that the sentiment of partisanship, of belonging to the group, is one of the strongest of human emotions. Because the enemy has been named in the media (Islam), the situation has become emotionally volatile. Another spectacular attack, coming on top of an economic recession could easily radicalize the latent attitudes of the United States, and also of Europe, where racial prejudices are especially close to the surface and ask no more than a pretext to burst out. This is the Sarajevo syndrome: an isolated act of madness becomes the pretext for a war that is just as mad, made of ancestral rancor, measureless ambitions, and armies in search of a war. We should not be fooled by our expressions of good will and charity toward the innocent victims of this or other distant wars. It is our own comfortable circumstances which permit us these benevolent sentiments. If conditions change so that poverty and famine put the fear of starvation in our guts, the human beast will reappear. And if epidemic becomes a clear and present danger, fear will unleash hatred in the land of the free, flinging missiles indiscriminately toward any supposed havens of the unseen enemy. And on the other side, no matter how profoundly complex and differentiated Islamic nations and tribes may be, they will be forced to behave as one clan by those who see advantage in radicalizing the conflict, whether they be themselves merchants or terrorists.

#### Plan leads to protectionism

MarketWatch 12, 9/12/12, This article is citing WTO Director General Pascal Lamy, "WTO official warns of rising protectionism",www.marketwatch.com/story/wto-official-warns-of-rising-protectionism-2012-09-21 Mollie

Mr. Lamy said an increase in WTO formal disputes is a natural consequence of the rise in trade restrictions globally, including antidumping and counter-subsidy tariffs. He warned that a proliferation of regional and bilateral trade pacts has made reaching a global deal to liberalize trade more difficult. Such deals may lower tariffs among the parties involved, but they can lower the incentive for parties to come to the table to tackle more difficult non-tariff issues, he said. "The risk of fragmentation becomes more acute in today's world where tariffs are increasingly an instrument of the past," Mr. Lamy said.

#### Plan isolates China

Moody 1AC Author 2013 [Glyn, technology journalist and consultant, TechDirt, 3/13, http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130313/10181122311/mexico-will-ask-to-join-us-eu-transatlantic-trade-agreement.shtml]

Whether or not Mexico and Canada become part of TAFTA, and under what terms, it's pretty clear what the US strategy here is. Just today we learned that South Korea is likely to join Japan in asking to sign up to the TPP talks. That would make TPP the defining international agreement for the entire Pacific region. TAFTA obviously aims to do the same for the Atlantic. As well as establishing the US as the key link between the giant TPP and TAFTA blocs, this double-headed approach would also isolate the main emerging economies -- Brazil, Russia, India and above all China -- if they refuse to join as presumably junior partners. That globe-spanning pair of trade pacts, it would seem, are what Obama hopes to be remembered for when he leaves office: his legacy to America -- and to history.

#### China perceives this as encirclement

**Farley 11** - Professor of military doctrine and national security @ University of Kentucky [Dr. Robert Farley, “Over the Horizon: Defining Red Lines to Avoid War With China,” World Politic Review | 09 Nov 2011, pg. <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10607/over-the-horizon-defining-red-lines-to-avoid-war-with-china>]

But nations don’t always expect war, either. Wars generally involve a degree of miscalculation, at least by one side, otherwise the parties would recognize the respective power balances and resolve the dispute without engaging in hostilities. The authors of the RAND report are correct to observe that war between the U.S. and China would probably result from a long-term series of miscalculations and misunderstandings, potentially ignited by a sudden change in circumstances. However, misperceptions might also affect long-term U.S. and Chinese policy in ways that make war in the future much more likely.¶ Clearly, certain long-term interests of the United States and China differ. Although both countries seek a peaceful commons in which they can enjoy the fruits of international trade, they differ regarding the balance of responsibility for protecting that commons. They also disagree about the political status of Taiwan, the relationship between North and South Korea, and a variety of other questions associated with East Asian regional politics. None of these differences need to become disputes, much less lead to war. Nevertheless, both the U.S. and China have “red lines,” or negotiating positions that they will risk war over rather than compromise on them. As long as a political conflict stays between the lines, peace holds.¶ But leaders have a strong incentive to deceive with regard to their red lines. Displaying intransigence can often work as a negotiating strategy, forcing the other player to compromise. However, such deception runs the risk of convincing an opponent that no agreement can be reached. Normally, too, at least some part of crisis negotiations are public, meaning that leaders can find themselves trapped between international interlocutors and domestic commitments, both inside and outside government. Such public declarations -- by a U.S. president regarding America’s commitment to defending Taiwan from attack, for instance -- might subsequently transform a negotiating tactic into a shooting war.¶ And of course, both sides have to prepare for war, both to improve their negotiating positions and in case negotiations fail. The latest iteration of such planning among U.S. strategic circles is AirSea Battle, an operational-level doctrine designed to facilitate cooperation between air and sea military assets, with ground forces largely expected to remain on the sidelines. China’s military might is now sufficient that the United States cannot leave room for the kind of error that inter-service conflict normally produces; its military machine has to run as efficiently as possible in order to plausibly threaten the People’s Liberation Army with defeat. While AirSea Battle doesn’t officially designate China as the expected opponent, no other foe would be plausible. For its part, China will continue to develop a system of anti-access capabilities designed mainly to force a U.S. president to hesitate before deploying aircraft carriers to respond to a crisis in East Asia.¶ And herein lies the problem: Any plan for war against China indicates that the United States is thinking seriously about war with China, thus potentially inspiring a Chinese reaction. What’s more, doctrinal and procurement decisions made now without full consideration of how the strategic situation might change could leave the United States -- or China -- with capabilities that don’t support their future diplomatic commitments. But a lack of preparation for war would indicate to the PRC that the United States has few if any “red lines” in East Asia, thus encouraging Chinese assertiveness. Given the likelihood that the United States is indeed willing to fight over some values -- perhaps Taiwan, perhaps South Korea -- such a message could prove disastrous, leading to misperception, miscalculation and the chance that the partners might become locked into a path to war.¶ There is no ready solution to this problem, because it lies at the heart of all diplomatic activity. Absent exceptional intelligence work, the motivation and resolve of diplomatic partners will always remain something of a mystery. A dense set of relationships and interactions undoubtedly helps create transparency, as interlocutors become familiar enough with each other to recognize the difference between real red lines and their rhetorical doppelgangers. This density of interactions involves not just high-level diplomatic meetings, but also commercial and military relationships. The RAND authors suggest that the United States work to commit itself to the defense and support of regional allies. While such a policy might threaten China with encirclement, it could also help reduce uncertainty; public commitments manifested through strong bilateral relationships are difficult to abandon, even in a crisis. However, even a policy of commitment is only as valuable as the capabilities devoted to its maintenance, and the U.S. advantage over China in this regard will become strained over the coming decades.

#### China lashes out – causes Asian war

**Garver & Wang 10** – Professors of International Relations @ Georgia Institute of Technology [John W. Garver & Fei-Ling Wang, “China’s Anti-encirclement Struggle,” Asian Security, vol. 6, no. 3, 2010, pp. 238–261

China is in a quandary in its anti-encirclement struggle. Logic suggests that it use its growing power to shape its international environment along lines favorable to China’s security. Failure to punish China’s neighbors who align with distant powers or with one another against China creates an environment that tacitly encourages, and perhaps even rewards (via benefits conferred by the distant hostile power), China’s neighbors for trampling on China’s core security interests. Such a weak approach would not foster respect for China’s great and growing power. A willingness to use China’s power in support of China’s interests, however, fosters an attitude of foreign respect, or at least so it may be argued. Failure to act forcefully would also open China’s leaders to criticism by increasingly influential nationalist opinion within China. Conversely, use of China’s power in coercive ways intensifies neighboring countries’ fear of China’s power, creating incentives for them to move further together and into alignment with the United States.¶ China’s anti-encirclement struggle seems to rely on the logic of defeating China’s enemies one by one, of dividing and driving a wedge between one’s opponents. Simultaneous punishment of India and Japan would have driven those countries closer together. China’s interest is to keep them apart. In line with this, Beijing avoided “punishing” Japan and India at the same time. This coordination probably took place in the FALSG, a body headed by a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, with senior representation from the Foreign Ministry, the military, and party foreign affairs agencies. The FALSG undertakes to coordinate foreign policy decisions in various sectors.93 The assumption of noncoordination implies that China’s core security interest (nonalignment of its neighbors against it) played little or no role, with policy toward India and Japan proceeding entirely on the basis of purely bilateral issues. This seems implausible given the gravity of Chinese security interests involved with Japan, India, and the relations of both those countries and the United States.¶ The United States, India, and Japan are playing a high-risk game. The underlying calculation of deterring Chinese resort to military moves against the interests of one or all three countries may well be a prudent approach. But the risks are nonetheless high. Germany’s road to war in 1914 and Japan’s road in 1941 were to a significant degree predicated on a sense of being encircled by a coalition of hostile powers. Both were determined to break out of that encirclement. If leaders in Beijing conclude that the coalition congealing against China is becoming too powerful, too solid, too obvious, or simply too unfair, they might conclude it necessary to strike against one or another member of the “anti-China coalition.” This would confront the United States with the choice of supporting its friend against China possibly risking a major war with China, or remaining neutral and risking the collapse of the whole structure designed to “hedge” or constrain rising China. Pg. 258-259

#### Trade does not solve war—there’s no correlation between trade and peace

MARTIN et al ‘8 (Phillipe, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, and Centre for Economic Policy Research; Thierry MAYER, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, CEPII, and Centre for Economic Policy Research, Mathias THOENIG, University of Geneva and Paris School of Economics, The Review of Economic Studies 75)

Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science argues that increasing trade flows and the spread of free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can partly be traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: The main objective of the European trade integration process was to prevent the killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again.1 Figure 1 suggests2 however, that during the 1870–2001 period, the correlation between trade openness and military conflicts is not a clear cut one. The first era of globalization, at the end of the 19th century, was a period of rising trade openness and multiple military conflicts, culminating with World War I. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly, while the number of conflicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). There is no clear evidence that the 1990s, during which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower prevalence of military conflicts, even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.

## EU

#### Collapse inevitable – current rate can’t maintain gdp and is causing severe climate change – freeing ourselves from the myth of economic growth allows a mindset shift that creates value to life

**Gardner, 13 –** (Dave Gardner, director of the documentary, *Growthbusters: Hooked on Growth*, and founding contributor to [www.growthbiasbusted.org](http://www.growthbiasbusted.org). August 20, 2013. “Planetary Overload: Faked Out by the Holy Grail of Economic Growth,” http://nationbuilders.thenation.com/profiles/blogs/planetary-overload-faked-out-by-the-holy-grail-of-economic-growth)//SDL

Today (August 20) is Earth Overshoot Day, according to scientists at Global Footprint Network. That means in about eight months we've consumed the renewable resources the Earth takes a year to replenish. If we want to live sustainably and leave our children a world worth inheriting, we need to turn off the lights, stop eating, drinking, driving, flying, and shopping - and hold our breath for the rest of the year - to make up for our unsustainable rate of resource use.¶ WWF's Living Planet Report tells us we're using 50% more resources each year than the Earth can replenish. That's why we're seeing climate disruption, fisheries collapsing, aquifer and river levels dropping, fertile soil declining and deserts expanding. In the U.S. we're actually using resources at five times the sustainable rate. Overshoot Day for the U.S. was back in March!¶ How did we get here? Our use of resources is determined by the size of our economy and our population. Forty years ago, a group of MIT scientists ran computer models that revealed we should change course in order to live within our means on planet Earth. We ignored those models and allowed our global population and economy to cross into unsustainable territory. The primary reason: our quest for the Holy Grail of economic growth. We didn't just allow overshoot to happen; we have pursued it. ¶ This quest for perpetual economic growth has also been driving nations, regions and cities to pursue population growth (more workers and more consumers make for a bigger economy). Today we have over 7 billion people - either living materially affluent lifestyles or aspiring to do so. We have a $74 trillion global economy. Just maintaining current GDP requires extraction of raw materials from the planet at unsustainable rates. Constantly growing GDP accelerates the liquidation of natural resources.¶ So strong is our conviction that economic growth is a universal, unalloyed good, we've been happy to sacrifice the integrity of our life support systems to keep it up. If we were living on a spaceship, this would be comparable to dismantling and devouring the craft in order to feed our voracious appetite for more. Everlasting economic growth should come with a warning: Don't Try This at Home!¶ Our obsession with economic growth is based on the myth that it improves our lives. That myth was born when we confused cause with effect. During the 19th and 20th centuries we made great strides in reducing mortality and making life more convenient. Few would argue electricity, indoor plumbing, the internal combustion engine, flight, telecommunications and computers haven't worked wonders. Our mistake has been assuming the economic growth that occurred during this time period is responsible for these technological achievements.¶ Thomas Edison didn't say one day, "Ah, GDP growth is 3%; that gives me an idea for generating electricity!" Economic growth was a byproduct of widespread adoption of these achievements. It was accelerated by harnessing the power of fossil fuels and gaining access to previously untapped continents of resources. Over time, we conflated growth with progress. We believe we must have economic growth, and we've built a system that depends on it. If we don't spend enough at the mall, if we don't buy enough cars or build more and more houses, our economy collapses.¶ Equating progress with GDP growth, however, is like equating a rise in automobile exhaust with increasing mobility. Mobility is desirable, but if we gauge it by measuring exhaust, we are not likely to focus on healthy, sustainable ways to improve mobility. Good lives with needs met are good, but when we gauge them by measuring economic throughput, we get off track and focus on the wrong things. We should be finding ways to improve our lives that don't require us to dismantle our spaceship.¶ The good news is the very things that really count in life, that bring fulfillment, happiness and a sense of purpose, don't require the creation and consumption of more stuff. Abandoning our quest for the Holy Grail of economic growth will free us to step off the treadmill and spend our time doing what matters - what Mike Nickerson describes in Life, Money & Illusion as "the three L's:" loving, learning, and laughing. Here's the announcement from Global Footprint Network. Here's a brief video about overshoot from the Global Footprint Network.

**Best scientific models show economic decline is key to solving anthropogenic run-away warming that will cause total extinction**

**Li 10** – (Dr. Ming Li, Assistant Professor Department of Economics, University of Utah. 2010. “The 21st Century Crisis: Climate Catastrophe or Socialism”, Paper prepared for the David Gordon Memorial Lecture at URPE Summer Conference)//SDL

The global average surface temperature is now about 0.8C (0.8 degree Celsius) higher than the pre-industrial time. Under the current trend, the world is on track towards a long-term warming between 4C and 8C. At this level of global warming, the world would be in an extreme greenhouse state not seen for almost 100 million years, devastating human civilization and destroying nearly all forms of life on the present earth (Conner and McCarthy 2009).¶ The scientific community has reached the consensus that the current global warming results from the excessive accumulation in the atmosphere of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (such as methane and nitrous oxide) emitted by human economic activities.[[1]](#footnote-1) The capitalist historical epoch has been characterized by the explosive growth of material production and consumption. The massive expansion of the world economy has been powered by fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas). Since 1820, the world economy has expanded by about seventy times and the world emissions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuels burning have increased by about sixty times (see Figure 1).¶ At the United Nations conference on climate change concluded at Copenhagen in December 2009, the world’s governments officially committed to the objective of limiting global warming to no more than 2C. However, according to the “Climate Action Tracker”, despite the official statement, the national governments’ current pledges regarding emission reduction in fact imply a warming of at least 3C by the end of the 21st century with more warming to come in the following centuries (Climate Action Tracker 2010).¶ In reality, all the major national governments are committed to infinite economic growth and none of them is willing to consider any emission reduction policy that could undermine economic growth. This is not simply because of intellectual ignorance or lack of political will. The pursuit of endless accumulation of capital (and infinite economic growth) is derived from the basic laws of motion of the capitalist economic system. Without fundamental social transformation, human civilization is now on the path to self-destruction. The next section (Section 2) reviews the basic scientific facts concerning the climate change crisis. Without an end of economic growth, it is virtually impossible for meaningful climate stabilization to be achieved (Section 3). However, both capitalist enterprises and states are constantly driven to expand production and consumption. The system of nation states effectively rules out a meaningful global political solution to the climate change crisis (Section 4). The climate change crisis is but one of several long-term historical trends that are now leading to the structural crisis of capitalism (Section 5). The resolution of the crisis and the survival of the humanity require the building of a fundamentally different social system that is based on social ownership of the means of production and society-wide planning (Section 6).

#### Even massive economic decline has zero chance of war

Jervis 11 – (Robert Jervis, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. December 2011. “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425)

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

**Growth makes war inevitable**

**Trainer 2**—Senior Lecturer of School of Social Work @ University of New South Wales (Ted, If You Want Affluence, Prepare for War, Democracy & Nature, Vol. 8, No. 2, EBSCO,)

If this limits-to-growth analysis is at all valid, the implications for the problem of global peace and conflict and security are clear and savage. If we all remain determined to increase our living standards, our level of production and consumption, in a world where resources are already scarce, where only a few have affluent living standards but another 8 billion will be wanting them too, and which we, the rich, are determined to get richer without any limit, then nothing is more guaranteed than that there will be increasing levels of conflict and violence. To put it another way, if we insist on remaining affluent we will need to remain heavily armed. Increased conflict in at least the following categories can be expected. First, the present conflict over resources between the rich elites and the poor majority in the Third World must increase, for example, as ‘development’ under globalisation takes more land, water and forests into export markets. Second, there are conflicts between the Third World and the rich world, the major recent examples being the war between the US and Iraq over control of oil. Iraq invaded Kuwait and the US intervened, accompanied by much high-sounding rhetoric (having found nothing unacceptable about Israel’s invasions of Lebanon or the Indonesian invasion of East Timor). As has often been noted, had Kuwait been one of the world’s leading exporters of broccoli, rather than oil, it is doubtful whether the US would have been so eager to come to its defence. At the time of writing, the US is at war in Central Asia over ‘terrorism’. Few would doubt that a ‘collateral’ outcome will be the establishment of regimes that will give the West access to the oil wealth of Central Asia. Following are some references to the connection many have recognised between rich world affluence and conflict. General M.D. Taylor, US Army retired argued ‘... US military priorities just be shifted towards insuring a steady flow of resources from the Third World’. Taylor referred to ‘… fierce competition among industrial powers for the same raw materials markets sought by the United States’ and ‘… growing hostility displayed by have-not nations towards their affluent counterparts’.62 ‘Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product; within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets’.63 ‘That more than half of the people on this planet are poorly nourished while a small percentage live in historically unparalleled luxury is a sure recipe for continued and even escalating international conflict.’64 The oil embargo placed on the US by OPEC in the early 1970s prompted the US to make it clear that it was prepared to go to war in order to secure supplies. ‘President Carter last week issued a clear warning that any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf would lead to war.’ It would ‘… be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States’.65 ‘The US is ready to take military action if Russia threatens vital American interests in the Persian Gulf, the US Secretary of Defence, Mr Brown, said yesterday.’66 Klare’s recent book Resource Wars discusses this theme in detail, stressing the coming significance of water as a source of international conflict. ‘Global demand for many key materials is growing at an unsustainable rate. … the incidence of conflict over vital materials is sure to grow. … The wars of the future will largely be fought over the possession and control of vital economic goods. … resource wars will become, in the years ahead, the most distinctive feature of the global security environment.’67 Much of the rich world’s participation in the conflicts taking place throughout the world is driven by the determination to back a faction that will then look favourably on Western interests. In a report entitled, ‘The rich prize that is Shaba’, Breeze begins, ‘Increasing rivalry over a share-out between France and Belgium of the mineral riches of Shaba Province lies behind the joint Franco– Belgian paratroop airlift to Zaire. … These mineral riches make the province a valuable prize and help explain the West’s extended diplomatic courtship …’68 Then there is potential conflict between the rich nations who are after all the ones most dependent on securing large quantities of resources. ‘The resource and energy intensive modes of production employed in nearly all industries necessitate continuing armed coercion and competition to secure raw materials.’69 ‘Struggles are taking place, or are in the offing, between rich and poor nations over their share of the world product, within the industrial world over their share of industrial resources and markets …’70 Growth, competition, expansion … and war Finally, at the most abstract level, the struggle for greater wealth and power is central in the literature on the causes of war. ‘… warfare appears as a normal and periodic form of competition within the capitalist world economy. … world wars regularly occur during a period of economic expansion. ’71 ‘War is an inevitable result of the struggle between economies for expansion.’72 Choucri and North say their most important finding is that domestic growth is a strong determinant of national expansion and that this results in competition between nations and war.73 The First and Second World Wars can be seen as being largely about imperial grabbing. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their territory and resource access. Britain already held much of the world within its empire … which it had previously fought 72 wars to take! ‘Finite resources in a world of expanding populations and increasing per capita demands create a situation ripe for international violence.’74 Ashley focuses on the significance of the quest for economic growth. ‘War is mainly explicable in terms of differential growth in a world of scarce and unevenly distributed resources … expansion is a prime source of conflict. So long as the dynamics of differential growth remain unmanaged, it is probable that these long term processes will sooner or later carry major powers into war.’75 Security The point being made can be put in terms of security. One way to seek security is to develop greater capacity to repel attack. In the case of nations this means large expenditure of money, resources and effort on military preparedness. However there is a much better strategy; i.e. to live in ways that do not oblige you to take more than your fair share and therefore that do not give anyone any motive to attack you. Tut! This is not possible unless there is global economic justice. If a few insist on levels of affluence, industrialisation and economic growth that are totally impossible for all to achieve, and which could not be possible if they were taking only their fair share of global resources, then they must remain heavily armed and their security will require readiness to use their arms to defend their unjust privileges. In other words, if we want affluence we must prepare for war. If we insist on continuing to take most of the oil and other resources while many suffer intense deprivation because they cannot get access to them then we must be prepared to maintain the aircraft carriers and rapid deployment forces, and the despotic regimes, without which we cannot secure the oil fields and plantations. Global peace is not possible without global justice, and that is not possible unless rich countries move to ‘The Simpler Way’.

**Extinction**

**Chase-Dunn 96**—Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for Research on World-Systems at the University of (Christopher, Conflict Among Core States: World-System Cycles and Trends, 23 January 1996, http://wsarch.ucr.edu/archive/papers/c-d&hall/warprop.htm,)

Note-figure omitted

Late in the K-wave upswing (i.e. in the 2020s), the world-system schema predicts a window of vulnerability to another round of world war. This is when world wars have occurred in the past. Intensified rivalry and competition for raw materials and markets will coincide with a multipolar distribution of military power among core states. The world-system model does not predict who the next hegemon will be. Rather it designates that there will be structural forces in motion that will favor the construction of a new hierarchy. Historical particularities and the unique features of the era will shape the outcome and select the winners and losers. If it were possible for the current system to survive the holocaust of another war among core states, the outcome of the war would be the main arbiter of hegemonic succession. While the hegemonic sequence has been a messy method of selecting global "leadership" in the past, the settlement of hegemonic rivalry by force in the future will be a disaster that our species may not survive. It is my concern about this possible disaster that motivates this effort to understand how the hegemonic sequence has occurred in the past and the factors affecting hegemonic rivalry in the next decades. What are the cyclical processes and secular trends that may affect the probability of future world wars? The world-system model is presented in Figure 1. This model depicts the variables that I contend will be the main influences on the probability of war among core states. The four variables that raise the probability of core war are the Kondratieff cycle, hegemonic decline, population pressure (and resource scarcity) and global inequality. The four variables that reduce the probability of core war are the destructiveness of weaponry, international economic interdependency, international political integration and disarmament. The probability of war may be high without a war occurring, of course. Joshua Goldstein's (1988) study of war severity (battle deaths per year) in wars among the "great powers" demonstrated the existence of a fifty-year cycle of core wars. Goldstein's study shows how this "war wave" tracks rather closely with the Kondratieff long economic cycle over the past 500 years of world-system history. It is the future of this war cycle that I am trying to predict. Factors that Increase the Likelihood of War Among Core States The proposed model divides variables into those that are alleged to increase the probability of war among core states and those that decrease that probability. There are four of each. Kondratieff waves The first variable that has a positive effect on the probability of war among core powers is the Kondratieff wave -- a forty to sixty year cycle of economic growth and stagnation. Goldstein (1988) provides evidence that the most destructive core wars tend to occur late in a Kondratieff A-phase (upswing). Earlier research by Thompson and Zuk (1982) also supports the conclusion that core wars are more likely to begin near the end of an upswing. Boswell and Sweat's (1991) analysis also supports the Goldstein thesis. But several other world-system theorists have argued that core wars occur primarily during K-wave B-phases. This disagreement over timing is related to a disagreement over causation. According to Goldstein states are war machines that always have a desire to utilize military force, but wars are costly and so statesmen tend to refrain from going to war when state revenues are low. On the other hand, statesmen are more likely to engage in warfare when state revenues are high (because the states can then afford the high costs of war). Boswell and Sweat call this the "resource theory of war."

#### Multiple issues overcome passage - prefer *experts*

Erlanger 6/12, Steven Erlanger, New York Times, very dedicated reporter with background at a variety of large scale newspapers, graduated from Harvard, this article cites said Douglas J. Elliott, a senior fellow in economics at the Brookings Institution., "Conflicting Goals Complicate an Effort to Forge a Trans-Atlantic Trade Deal". www.nytimes.com/2013/06/13/business/global/to-create-jobs-europe-pushes-for-trade-deal-with-us.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0 Mollie

PARIS — The leaders of the European Union, mired in recession and battered by increasing opposition from voters, are desperate for political success to promote economic growth. They are pushing for a rapid negotiation of a trade agreement with the United States aimed at expanding commerce and creating jobs. But many experts say any such deal faces long odds. France has already raised objections about its “cultural exception,” which is aimed at protecting subsidized, domestic movies and television programs, and continued to press the issue ahead of a meeting on Friday of the European Union’s trade ministers. At the same time, there is a range of other, probably more serious problems, including agricultural disputes over things like genetically modified food and chlorinated chicken and regulatory questions about car safety, pharmaceuticals and financial derivatives. New concerns about widespread American spying on Internet and telephone traffic will make existing disagreements about data privacy, an important issue in Europe, even more fractious.

#### Alt cause – bugging incident

Pop 1/7/13 – (Valentina, “EU-US relations at risk after new bugging scandal”, EU Observer, http://euobserver.com/foreign/120689)//javi

EU politicians have questioned the future of trade talks and demanded explanations from Washington after Der Spiegel revelations that EU offices in Brussels, New York and Washington are bugged by American intelligence. The telephone lines and computer networks of EU offices in Brussels were tapped by the American National Security Agency (NSA) under its so-called Prism surveillance programme, German daily Der Spiegel reports, based on new documents leaked by fugitive whistleblower Edward Snowden. An NSA document from September 2010 describes Europeans as specific targets, the German magazine says. In addition, a series of bogus phone calls to the Justus Lipsius building, which hosts the EU Council, were traced back to Nato headquarters in Brussels where NSA agents are based, indicating an attack on the EU communications security, Spiegel writes. The German leak is the latest in a series of disclosures about Prism published over the last few weeks in British daily The Guardian and in the US paper, the Washington Post. They show that the US government searches through the telephone calls, emails, instant messages and Facebook data of people in or outside the US by infiltrating the servers of Internet giants like Apple or Microsoft. The British intelligence service, GCHQ, is allegedly running an even bigger surveillance programme named Tempora, which taps into transatlantic fibre-optic cables used for telephone and Internet services. "As soon as we saw these reports, the European External Action Service made contact with the US authorities in both Washington DC and Brussels to seek urgent clarification of the veracity of, and facts surrounding, these allegations," foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton said in a statement. Her New York and Washington delegations send diplomatic cables classified up to the level of "Secret." The designation covers texts which could "seriously harm" EU interests, "raise international tensions" or "threaten life" and "public order" if they get out. For his part, European Parliament chief Martin Schulz said EU-US relations risk serious harm. "I am deeply worried and shocked about the allegations of US authorities spying on EU offices. If the allegations prove to be true, it would be an extremely serious matter which will have a severe impact on EU-US relations," he said in an emailed statement. EU justice commissioner Viviane Reding on Sunday told an audience in Luxemburg that "partners do not spy on each other." She also questioned the future of the recently-launched EU-US free trade talks.

#### Reject the aff’s coercive politics—displaces voluntary efforts

**Younkins 2k** (Dr. Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business Administration at Wheeling Jesuit University in West Virginia, “Civil Society: The Realm of Freedom,” No 63, 6-10-2000, http://www.quebecoislibre.org/000610-11.htm,)

¶ Recently (and ironically), government projects and programs have been started to restore civil society through state subsidization or coercive mandates. Such coercion cannot create true voluntary associations. Statists who support such projects believe only in the power of political society – they don't realize that the subsidized or mandated activity can be performed voluntarily through the private interaction of individuals and associations. They also don't understand that to propose that an activity not be performed coercively, is not to oppose the activity, but simply its coercion. ¶ If civil society is to be revived, we must substitute voluntary cooperation for coercion and replace mandates with the rule of law. According to the Cato Handbook for Congress, Congress should: ¶ before trying to institute a government program to solve a problem, investigate whether there is some other government program that is causing the problem ... and, if such a program is identified, begin to reform or eliminate it; ¶ ask by what legal authority in the Constitution Congress undertakes an action ...; ¶ recognize that when government undertakes a program, it displaces the voluntary efforts of others and makes voluntary association in civil society appear redundant, with significant negative effects; and ¶ begin systematically to abolish or phase out those government programs that do what could be accomplished by voluntary associations in civil society ... recognizing that accomplishment through free association is morally superior to coercive mandates, and almost always generates more efficient outcomes. ¶ Every time taxes are raised, another regulation is passed, or another government program is adopted, we are acknowledging the inability of individuals to govern themselves. It follows that there is a moral imperative for us to reclaim our right to live in a civil society, rather than to have bureaucrats and politicians « solve » our problems and run our lives.

#### Mexican involvement kills the negotiations

Meacham 7/25, Carl Meacham, 7/25/13, “The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Mexico Wants In—Why Not?” Carl Meacham is the director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Tania Miranda, intern scholar with the CSIS Americas Program, provided research assistance. <http://csis.org/publication/trans-atlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-mexico-wants-why-not> Mollie

First, given the years of encouragement that preceded the formal start of EU-U.S. negotiations, neither party wishes to jeopardize what could be the biggest FTA in history by bringing more participants on board--regardless of the value their inclusion adds. Leaders from both the United States and the EU think this would bring a long and burdensome political process that could prove detrimental for the negotiations. And though both have shied away from anything that might complicate the process of reaching an initial agreement, neither has rejected the idea of accepting more members down the road, once the agreement is consolidated. The second argument is more of a corollary to the first. At his talk with the Americas Program last week, Christian Leffler, the EU’s managing director for the Americas, explained that because Mexico already shares FTAs with the United States and the EU, including Mexico in the TTIP can be seen as superfluous—at least for now. Particularly given the drag additional parties could put on negotiations, the benefits of including Mexico, so the argument goes, fail to outweigh the potential costs.

# Block

## Link to dedev

**Ahearn, 11 - http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/transatlantic-topics/Articles/economy/U.S.-EU\_Trade\_and\_Economic\_Relations\_CRS.pdf**

For much of the post World War II era, the United States and Europe provided key leadership to ¶ the global economy. Given the heft of their combined economies, what was decided by the two ¶ 25 Office of the United States Trade Representative, National Trade Estimates Report, 2010. ¶ 26 CRS Report RS21618, The European Union’s Reform Process: The Lisbon Treaty, by Kristin Archick and Derek E. ¶ Mix. ¶ 27 Member states have concluded some 1200 BITs, almost half of the BITs enforced around the world, to provide ¶ protection for fund repatriation and against unfair or uncompensated expropriation. They do not include market access ¶ or liberalization commitments. See Stephen Woolcock, The Treaty of Lisbon and the European Union as an actor in ¶ international trade, European Centre for International Political Economy, Working Paper No. 01/2010. ¶ 28 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trade Estimates Report, 2010. ¶ 29 The Atlantic Council of the United States, Transatlantic Leadership for a New Global Economy, Policy Paper, 2007. ¶ 30 Nicolas Veron, “Europe Needs Consistency in Welcoming Foreign Investors,” Bruegel, January 2011. U.S.-EU Trade and Economic Relations: Key Policy Issues for the 112th Congress ¶ ¶ Congressional Research Service 9 ¶ powers was often adopted by the rest of the world. While the United States and the EU still today ¶ remain central to the global economy, other countries have grown in prominence. This ¶ redistribution of global economic power, in turn, arguably increases the need for the United States ¶ and EU to work together to promote their continued competitiveness, and to ensure that the rules ¶ of the global economy remain steeped in values and principles that both sides share.

## 2nc overview (:35)

#### Now key – delay makes extinction inevitable

**Ledger 12** – (Florida news service citing Richard Heinberg, senior fellow at the Post-Carbon Institute. Yossim Hizzod, “Unsustainable Economy”, <http://www.theledger.com/article/20121127/EDIT02/121129434>)//SDL

With the Industrial Revolution came the idea of material progress possible for all mankind, with infinite economic growth. Alas, we live on a finite planet with finite resources.¶ A profoundly important 2012 book is "The End of Growth, Adapting to Our New Economic Reality," by Richard Heinberg. Mr. Heinberg says three big factors are converging, which will someday soon end most of all further economic growth in current modern industrial nations and also in nations which want to industrialize, e.g., China and India.¶ These three factors are:¶ The fast-approaching depletion of Earth's resources needed for industry to function.¶ The saturation point of the Earth to absorb toxic wastes and poisons from industrialization, e.g., global warming from carbon dioxide.¶ Modern societies now reaching the saturation point and the end of ability to use credit(national deficits) to stimulate more economic growth.¶ From Mr. Heinberg's book, it can be implied that if we first acknowledge this situation (maybe politically impossible) and then work to manage the coming economic decline, we can stop the regression at an 1880s economic level with trains and horses for transportation, thus maintain a national cohesion and national identity.¶ If leaders and voters ignore and deny the problem and do not try to manage the decline, we will get random chaos and a possible die-off of a large segment of the population from starvation, lack of medical care, etc. Survivors might return to a feudal type lifestyle where strongmen warlords rule isolated, disconnected regions. Or the worst-case scenario could be a return to a Stone-Age or Iron-Age system of tribes (gangs) fighting over the scarce resources.

**View this debate through a lens of warming – it makes econ collapse inevitable – they must first beat that to get any of their offense**

Thomas Homer-Dixon, 11 – (Thomas Homer-Dixon, the CIGI chair of global systems at the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo. January, 2011. “Economies can’t just keep on growing,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/unconventional\_wisdom?page=0,1)//SDL

Humanity has made great strides over the past 2,000 years, and we often assume that our path, notwithstanding a few bumps along the way, goes ever upward. But we are wrong: Within this century, environmental and resource constraints will likely bring global economic growth to a halt. Limits on available resources already restrict economic activity in many sectors, though their impact usually goes unacknowledged. Take rare-earth elements -- minerals and oxides essential to the manufacture of many technologies. When China recently stopped exporting them, sudden shortages threatened to crimp a wide range of industries. Most commentators believed that the supply crunch would ease once new (or mothballed) rare-earth mines are opened. But such optimism overlooks a fundamental physical reality. As the best bodies of ore are exhausted, miners move on to less concentrated deposits in more difficult natural circumstances. These mines cause more pollution and require more energy. In other words, opening new rare-earth mines outside China will result in staggering environmental impact. Or consider petroleum, which provides about 40 percent of the world's commercial energy and more than 95 percent of its transportation energy. Oil companies generally have to work harder to get each new barrel of oil. The amount of energy they receive for each unit of energy they invest in drilling has dropped from 100 to 1 in Texas in the 1930s to about 15 to 1 in the continental United States today. The oil sands in Alberta, Canada, yield a return of only 4 to 1. Coal and natural gas still have high energy yields. So, as oil becomes harder to get in coming decades, these energy sources will become increasingly vital to the global economy. But they're fossil fuels, and burning them generates climate-changing carbon dioxide. If the World Bank's projected rates for global economic growth hold steady, global output will have risen almost tenfold by 2100, to more than $600 trillion in today's dollars. So even if countries make dramatic reductions in carbon emissions per dollar of GDP, global carbon dioxide emissions will triple from today's level to more than 90 billion metric tons a year. Scientists tell us that tripling carbon emissions would cause such extreme heat waves, droughts, and storms that farmers would likely find they couldn't produce the food needed for the world's projected population of 9 billion people. Indeed, the economic damage caused by such climate change would probably, by itself, halt growth.

## 2NC Uniqueness

**Collapse is inevitable – increasing complexity makes a growth society unsustainable and all recent models agree.**

Hengeveld 12 – (2012, Rob, PhD, Professor of Earth and Life Sciences, University of Amsterdam, “Our apocalyptic odds,” [http://www.salon.com/2012/04/14/our\_apocalyptic\_odds/](http://www.salon.com/2012/04/14/our_apocalyptic_odds/" \t "_blank))

 Because they are much of a jumble as well, societies can crash or collapse. Such crashes not only develop rapidly, but their cause, course, and timing are unpredictable. Mathematicians call this field of study deterministic chaos: unpredictability reigns, even when nothing happens by chance; chance within the process only gives additional unpredictability. Imagine, therefore, what happens when such systems contain an element of chance as well.¶ So, how does chance work, and does chance depend on the number of people making up society and its complexity? If so, does the chance of societal collapse increase over time as our numbers and their resulting societal complexity grow? Have our living conditions changed (gradual soil salination, or a sudden rise in the price of food due to drought in Australia or Russia, for example)?¶ Think for a moment of a die: what is the chance of throwing, say, a five? A die has six sides, each with the same chance of turning up. The chance of throwing a five is one in six, or 17 percent. Conversely, the combined chance of throwing any number other than five is five in six, or 83 percent. But how great is the chance of getting a five within two consecutive throws? That chance is obviously twice as large, or 33 percent, and the chance of getting any other number is 67 percent. Therefore, the more throws, the greater the chance of getting your preferred five at least once. And the chance of missing it reduces accordingly. The same reasoning applies to, say, the chance of some explosion happening in an oil pipe, though in this case you are interested in the chance of the event not happening. Now the chance that some disaster will not happen is made as small as possible, say, one in 10,000, and the chance of an explosion occurring is only one in 9,999. Obviously, these chances also depend on the length of the pipe, on the number of pipes, on the number of welds, or the number of pumping and control stations, that is, on the complexity of the pipe system, and also on the length of the period the system is operating: the longer the pipes and the more there are, the greater the complexity of the system they form and the longer the period of operation, the greater the chance of something going wrong, resulting in an explosion.¶ Moreover, all these mistakes and disasters have different chances of happening, and all these chances are superimposed. You can try out for yourself what happens by throwing different kinds of dice, the normal one with six sides, then one with four, eight, ten, twelve, twenty, and one with thirty sides. The result is a very wiggly line when you add the outcomes of these sets of dice for a number of throws together for each point on this line. Each new point is different from any of the previous ones and therefore is impossible to predict; it was already impossible to predict the outcome of one single die. Still, this curve resembles the real world in many respects where also many chance events occur, the one adding to another and each with a different chance of happening.¶ In reality, the chances have different and varying weights relative to the total process as well, and they interact both linearly and nonlinearly, which we all kept constant and independent when we threw our seven sets of dice. How can we predict the future of society but in general terms of depletion and pollution rates? These are our certainties, but we really can’t predict in detail what will happen and when as a social or economic result. For these societal effects we can only say that the chance of collapse increases with an increasing complexity of society, as well as with increasing stress from resource depletion, pollution, and social inequality.¶ Think of the decline of ancient Rome, which took centuries; nobody knows why it declined; we have more explanations than authors. Because of the great influence of chance in all aspects of society, whose behavior is unknowable and, hence, unpredictable—manageable only up to some point, after which further developments grow out of hand. Why the reason for a crash such as the decline of Rome is also unknowable, and why its crash was unmanageable, is that people usually look at only one process in isolation, such as the invasion of the Gothic tribes or the general poisoning of people by lead in the water pipes. In many cases, however, a disaster is triggered by the coinciding of a number of different events or processes, not by a single event or process. Therefore, as our numbers continue to grow exponentially, the size and complexity of society increases exponentially relative to those numbers. Consequently, the predictability of a particular crash developing from the occurrence of a certain combination of chance events or processes decreases.¶ Moreover, because many factors can be interdependent, a crash in one sector pulls others in its wake,making it a general crash in no time and also making it more difficult to manipulate or manage.Crashes of our socioeconomic system will **therefore** become more frequent and less easy to control.¶ I think that the collapse of the present human population, its numbers and quality of life, is likely, and also that the most humane way to weather this period is to design a strategy and follow it ourselves rather than sit back and wait complacently. Unfortunately, the time for old customs and cultural traditions or of long-held beliefs and trusts is over. As the latest calculations from 1992 by Meadows and colleagues in “Beyond the Limits“ showed, our world can collapse, and this can happen even before any resource has definitively been depleted; collapse may come at any time and out of nowhere. It’s an inevitable, unavoidable result of **the behavior of** an oversized, complex, nonlinear system in which interdependent chance processes dominate.¶ The wave of large-scale deregulations because of the globalization of the last thirty years have only made this worse by allowing more positive feedback loops into the system. Nobody knows exactly how likely it is that our societal system will collapse or when. We know that this is theoretically inescapable, because all the local and national infrastructures and the global superstructure are based on abstractions. Moreover, system collapse follows from almost any simulation experiment based on relatively recent data—data that are now already twenty years old and are therefore too optimistic. In those twenty years, it has become even more likely that the conditions theoretically leading to system collapse will occur.

This **crisis is different than all previous ones**

**Li 10** – PhD, Assistant Professor Department of Economics, University of Utah (Minqui, paper prepared for the David Gordon Memorial Lecture at URPE Summer Conference 2010, “The 21st Century Crisis: Climate Catastrophe or Socialism”)

**The** impending **climate catastrophe is but one of several aspects of the** structural **crisis of capitalism in the 21st century**. **We are** currently **in the beginning of** a **prolonged** period of **global instability and chaos**. Similar periods of systemic chaos had happened before (for example, during the first half of the 20th century). Capitalism had managed to survive earlier crises, through institutional adjustments without changing the system’s essential features (production for profit and endless accumulation of capital).¶ Because of this historical observation, some have developed the belief that capitalism is such a remarkably “flexible” and “creative” system that it can always reform itself, adapt to change, survive crises, and meet challenges. But this belief is short-sighted and fundamentally ahistorical.¶ Like every other social system, **for capitalism to exist** and function, **it requires certain** **necessary historical conditions**. Capitalism would remain viable (and therefore “reformable”) only to the extent the necessary historical conditions required for its normal operations are present. But the development of capitalism inevitably leads to fundamental changes in the underlying historical conditions. Sooner or later, a point will be reached where the necessary historical conditions are no longer present, and capitalism as a historical system will cease to exist.¶ **If one compares the current systemic crisis with earlier instances of systemic crisis, what are some of the major differences?**¶ **First, in previous periods of crisis, the world’s natural resources remained relatively abundant and the global environment remained largely intact. Today,** **the** global **ecological system is literally on the verge of complete collapse. The** impending **climate catastrophe is only one among many** aspects of global **environmental crisis**. Global capitalism has already exhausted the environmental space for further capital accumulation.¶ **Secondly**, the **successful operations** **of the capitalist** world **system require** it be regulated by **an effective hegemonic power** at the systemic level. **However**, **with the decline of** the US **hegemony, no other** big **power was in a position to replace the US** to become the new hegemonic power. **Without a**n effective **hegemonic power, the system would be unable to pursue its** own **long-term interest** and solve system-wide problems.¶ **Thirdly, in the past the** capitalist **system had managed to survive** crisis **through social reforms**. In essence, social reform is for the system to buy off certain opposition groups by making limited concessions. The concessions have to be limited so that they do not undermine the essential interest of the ruling class. **Today, the system has run out of its** historical **space** **for social compromise**.¶ In virtually all the advanced capitalist countries, now a restoration of favorable conditions for capitalist accumulation would require nothing short of large and sustained declines of working class living standards. Will the western working classes simply surrender and give up their entire historical gains since the 19th century? If not, Western Europe and North America will again become major battlegrounds of class struggle in the coming decades.¶ Fourthly, **the world has reached** the **advanced** stage of **proletarianization**. Marx famously predicted that the proletariat would become the grave diggers of capitalism. For the entire 19th and much of 20th century, the process of proletarianization was largely limited to the “West” (the advanced capitalist countries). In the neoliberal era, as capital is relocated from advanced capitalist countries to the rest of the world to exploit the reserve army of cheap labor force, **there have been large formations of industrial working classes** in the non-western world.¶ Over time, the non-western working classes will have developed the organizational capacity and demand a growing range of economic, social, and political rights. For the capitalist world system, if its economic and ecological resources are already so limited that it is no longer possible to accommodate the historical demands of the western working classes, what is the chance for the system to accommodate the demands of the much larger non-western working classes?¶ If the system can no longer survive by buying off its potential oppositions, can it simply survive by repression, and for how long?¶ How will the combination of these trends play out in the coming decades? **Will the current** structural **crisis turn out to be the terminal crisis of capitalism? One thing is clear. If capitalism does survive** the current crisis, **there is** probably **not much hope for** the **humanity to survive** the coming global climate catastrophe. For the humanity’s sake, end capitalism before we are ended by capitalism.

## A2 Tech solves

**Tech doesn’t solve—prefer statistics**

**Speth, law prof, 8**—Served as President Jimmy Carter’s White House environmental adviser and as head of the United Nations’ largest agency for international development Prof at Vermont law school. Former dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies at Yale University . Former Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, teaching environmental and constitutional law. .Former Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality in the Executive Office of the President. Co-founder of the Natural Resources Defense Council. Was law clerk to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo L. Black JD, Yale. (James Gustave, The Bridge at the Edge of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to Sustainability, Gigapedia, 55-56,)

Another reason for concern about the growth coming our way is the absence of adequate natural self-correcting forces within the economy. One area of hope in this regard has been the natural evolution of technology. The economy of the future will not be identical to that of the past because technology is changing. It is creating opportunities to reduce materials consumed and wastes produced per unit of output; it is opening up new areas and new products that are lighter, smaller, more efficient. Clearly these things are happening. Resource productivity is increasing. There is a large literature on these trends. The principal fi nding is refl ected in the conclusion of a 2000 report of fi ve major European and U.S. research centers: “Industrial economies are becoming more efficient in their use of materials, but waste generation continues to increase. . . . Even as decoupling between economic growth and resource throughput occurred on a per capita and per unit GDP basis, overall resource use and waste flows into the environment continued to grow. We found no evidence of an absolute reduction in resource throughput. One half to three quarters of annual resource inputs to industrial economies are returned to the environment as wastes within a year.”19 Tellingly, one review of a large number of countries found that “with the exception of one specifi c case, no absolute decline of direct material input of industrial economics took place as those economies grew. . . . [T]he trend of material use in industrial countries is relatively steady.” It also found that, as economies grow, pressures on domestic resources are reduced by shifting the burden abroad to developing economies.20 More resource-intensive goods are imported. Another major review of studies of “dematerialization” found that “there is no compelling macroeconomic evidence that the U.S. economy is ‘decoupled’ from material inputs, and we know even less about the net environmental eff ects of many changes in materials use. We caution against gross generalizations about materials use, particularly the ‘gut’ feeling that technical change, substitution, and a shift to the information age inexorably lead to decreased materials intensity and reduced environmental impact.”21 Technology expert Arnulf Grubler has noted, “At best, dematerialization has led to a stabilization of absolute material use at high levels. . . . Improved materials and increased environmental productivity have substantially lessened the environmental impacts of output growth, even if, to date, output growth has generally outstripped improvements.”22

**Prefer our evidence—it’s based on physical capacities of the earth while theirs is theory**

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In nature, growth always slams up against non-negotiable constraints sooner or later. If a species finds that its food source has expanded, its numbers will increase to take advantage of those surplus calories—but then its food source will become depleted as more mouths consume it, and its predators will likewise become more numerous (more tasty meals for them!). Population "blooms" (that is, periods of rapid growth) are always followed by crashes and die-offs. Always. Here's another real-world example. In recent years China's economy has been growing at eight percent or more per year; that means it is more than doubling in size every ten years. Indeed, China consumes more than twice as much coal as it did a decade ago—the same with iron ore and oil. The nation now has four times as many highways as it did, and almost five times as many cars. How long can this go on? How many more doublings can occur before China has used up its key resources—or has simply decided that enough is enough and has stopped growing? It makes sense that economies should follow rules analogous to those that govern biological systems. Plants and animals tend to grow quickly when they are young, but then they reach a more or less stable mature size. In organisms, growth rates are largely controlled by genes. In economies, growth seems tied to factors such as the availability of resources—chiefly energy resources ("food" for the industrial system). During the 20th century, cheap and abundant fossil fuels enabled rapid economic expansion; at some point, therefore, fossil fuel depletion could put a brake on growth. It is also possible that industrial wastes could accumulate to the point that the biological systems that underpin economic activity (such as forests, crops, and human bodies) begin to fail. But economists generally don't see things this way. That's probably because most current economic theories were formulated during an anomalous historical period of sustained growth. Economists are merely generalizing from their experience: they can point to decades of steady growth in the recent past, and so they simply project that experience into the future. Moreover, they have ways to explain why modern market economies are immune to the kinds of limits that constrain natural systems; the two main ones concern substitution and efficiency. If a useful resource becomes scarce, its price will rise, and this creates an incentive for users of the resource to find a substitute. For example, if oil gets expensive enough, energy companies might start making liquid fuels from coal. Or they might develop other energy sources undreamed of today. Economists theorize that this process of substitution can go on forever. It's part of the magic of the free market. Increasing efficiency means doing more with less. In the U.S., the number of inflation-adjusted dollars generated in the economy for every unit of energy consumed has increased steadily over recent decades (the amount of energy, in British Thermal Units, required to produce a dollar of GDP has been dropping steadily, from close to 20,000 BTU per dollar in 1949 to 8,500 BTU in 2008). That's one kind of economic efficiency. Another has to do with locating the cheapest sources of materials, and the places where workers will be most productive and work for the lowest wages. As we increase efficiency, we use less—of either resources or money—to do more. That enables more growth. Finding substitutes for depleting resources and upping efficiency are undeniably effective adaptive strategies of market economies. Nevertheless, the question remains open as to how long these strategies can continue to work in the real world—which is governed less by economic theories than by the laws of physics. In the real world, some things don't have substitutes, or the substitutes are too expensive, or don't work as well, or can't be produced fast enough. And efficiency follows a law of diminishing returns: the first gains in efficiency are usually cheap, but every further incremental gain tends to cost more, until further gains become prohibitively expensive. Unlike economists, most physical scientists recognize that growth within any functioning, bounded system has to stop sometime.

# 2NC Warming

**Nuclear war doesn’t cause extinction or warming**

Seitz 6---former associate of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs (Russell, “The' Nuclear Winter ' Meltdown Photoshopping the Apocalypse”, http://adamant.typepad.com/seitz/2006/12/preherein\_honor.html)

All that remains of Sagan's Big Chill are curves such as this , but history is full of prophets of doom who fail to deliver, not all are without honor in their own land. The 1983 'Nuclear Winter " papers in Science were so politicized that even the eminently liberal President of The Council for a Liveable World called "The worst example of the misrepesentation of science to the public in my memory." Among the authors was Stanford President Donald Kennedy. Today he edits Science , the nation's major arbiter of climate science--and policy. Below, a case illustrating the mid-range of the ~.7 to ~1.6 degree C maximum cooling the 2006 studies suggest is superimposed in color on the Blackly Apocalyptic predictions published in Science Vol. 222, 1983 . They're worth comparing, because the range of soot concentrations in the new models overlaps with cases assumed to have dire climatic consequences in the widely publicized 1983 scenarios -- "Apocalyptic predictions require, to be taken seriously, higher standards of evidence than do assertions on other matters where the stakes are not as great." wrote Sagan in Foreign Affairs , Winter 1983 -84. But that "evidence" was never forthcoming. 'Nuclear Winter' never existed outside of a computer except as air-brushed animation commissioned by the a PR firm---Porter Novelli Inc. Yet Sagan predicted "the extinction of the human species " as temperatures plummeted 35 degrees C and the world froze in the aftermath of a nuclear holocaust. Last year, Sagan's cohort tried to reanimate the ghost in a machine anti-nuclear activists invoked in the depths of the Cold War, by re-running equally arbitrary scenarios on a modern interactive Global Circulation Model. But the Cold War is history in more ways than one. It is a credit to post-modern computer climate simulations that they do not reproduce the apocalyptic results of what Sagan oxymoronically termed "a sophisticated one dimensional model." The subzero 'baseline case' has melted down into a tepid 1.3 degrees of average cooling- grey skies do not a Ragnarok make . What remains is just not the stuff that End of the World myths are made of. It is hard to exaggerate how seriously " nuclear winter "was once taken by policy analysts who ought to have known better. Many were taken aback by the sheer force of Sagan's rhetoric Remarkably, Science's news coverage of the new results fails to graphically compare them with the old ones Editor Kennedy and other recent executives of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, once proudly co-authored and helped to publicize. You can't say they didn't try to reproduce this Cold War icon. Once again, soot from imaginary software materializes in midair by the megaton , flying higher than Mount Everest . This is not physics, but a crude exercise in ' garbage in, gospel out' parameter forcing designed to maximize and extend the cooling an aeosol can generate, by sparing it from realistic attrition by rainout in the lower atmosphere. Despite decades of progress in modeling atmospheric chemistry , there is none in this computer simulation, and ignoring photochemistry further extends its impact. Fortunately , the history of science is as hard to erase as it is easy to ignore. Their past mastery of semantic agression cannot spare the authors of "Nuclear Winter Lite " direct comparison of their new results and their old. Dark smoke clouds in the lower atmosphere don't last long enough to spread across the globe. Cloud droplets and rainfall remove them. rapidly washing them out of the sky in a matter of days to weeks- not long enough to sustain a global pall. Real world weather brings down particles much as soot is scrubbed out of power plant smoke by the water sprays in smoke stack scrubbers, Robock acknowledges this- not even a single degree of cooling results when soot is released at lower elevations in the models . The workaround is to inject the imaginary aerosol at truly Himalayan elevations---pressure altitudes of 300 millibar and higher , where the computer model's vertical transport function modules pass it off to their even higher neighbors in the stratosphere , where it does not rain and particles linger.. The new studies like the old suffer from the disconnect between a desire to paint the sky black and the vicissitudes of natural history. As with many exercise in worst case models both at invoke rare phenomena as commonplace, claiming it prudent to assume the worst. But the real world is subject to Murphy's lesser known second law- if everything must go wrong, don't bet on it. In 2006 as in 1983 firestorms and forest fires that send smoke into the stratosphere rise to alien prominence in the modelers re-imagined world , but in the real one remains a very different place, where though every month sees forest fires burning areas the size of cities---2,500 hectares or larger , stratospheric smoke injections arise but once in a blue moon. So how come these neo-nuclear winter models feature so much smoke so far aloft for so long?

#### Multiple structural factors check war

Christopher J **Fettweis**, National Security Decision Making Department, US Naval War College, December 0**6**, “A Revolution in International Relation Theory: Or, What If Mueller Is Right?”, International Studies Review, Volume 8, Issue 4, Wiley)

The obsolescence-of-major-war argument is familiar enough to need little introduction (Mueller 1989, 1995, 2004; see also Rosecrance 1986, 1999; Ray 1989; Kaysen 1990; Van Evera 1990–1991; Kegley 1993; Jervis 2002; Mandelbaum 2002). In its most basic and common form, the thesis holds that a broad shift in attitudes toward warfare has occurred within the most powerful states of the international system, virtually removing the possibility for the kind of war that pits the strongest states against each other. Major wars, fought by the most powerful members of the international system, are, in Michael Mandelbaum's (1998/1999:20) words, “somewhere between impossible and unlikely.” The argument is founded upon a traditional liberal faith in the possibility of moral progress within the society of great powers, which has created for the first time “an almost universal sense that the deliberate launching of a war can no longer be justified” (Ray 1989:425; also Luard 1986, 1989). To use Francis Fukayama's (1992) phrase, it is the “autonomous power of ideas” that has brought major war to an end. Whereas past leaders were at times compelled by the masses to use force in the defense of the national honor, today popular pressures urge peaceful resolutions to disputes between industrialized states. This normative shift has all but removed warfare from the set of options before policymakers, making it a highly unlikely outcome. Mueller (1989:11) has referred to the abolition of slavery and dueling as precedents. “Dueling, a form of violence famed and fabled for centuries, is avoided not merely because it has ceased to seem ‘necessary,’ but because it has sunk from thought as a viable, conscious possibility. You can't fight a duel if the idea of doing so never occurs to you or your opponent.” By extension, states cannot fight wars if doing so does not occur to them or to their opponent. Major war has become, in Mueller's words, “sub-rationally unthinkable.” Obviously, the obsolescence-of-major-war argument is not without critics. First, and most basic, the literature is sometimes quite vague about what constitutes a “major war” and who exactly the “great powers” are. In Retreat from Doomsday, Mueller (1989) alternately describes his data set as consisting of “developed countries” (p. 4), the “first and second worlds” (p. 256), the “major and not-so-major countries” (p. 5), and the 44 wealthiest states (p. 252). Others refer to the great powers as those states with a certain minimum standard of living, especially those in Europe (Luard 1986:398); modern, “industrial societies” (Kaysen 1990); the “leading global powers” (Väyrynen 2006:13); or merely “the most powerful members of the international system” (Mandelbaum 1998/1999:21). What constitutes a “major” war is also often left unclear. Some analyses use arbitrary quantitative values (for example, 1,000 battle deaths); others study only world wars, those fought by the most powerful members of the international system, drawing on all their resources, with the potential to lead to outcomes of “revolutionary geopolitical consequences including the birth and death of regimes, the redrawing of borders, and the reordering of the hierarchy of sovereign states” (Mandelbaum 1998/1999:20). Definitions are often the last refuge of academic scoundrels—many IR theories deal with potentially contradictory information by simply refining or redefining the data under consideration. Perhaps the best way to avoid this pitfall is to err on the side of inclusion, expanding the analysis as broadly as possible. While the obsolescence-of-major-war argument clearly covers the kind of catastrophic wars that Mandelbaum analyzes, any big war between industrialized, powerful states would render the proposition false. At its essence, like pornography, one knows major war when one sees it. Major powers will likely occasionally deem it in their interest to strike the minor, and at times small, states, especially those led by nondemocratic, unenlightened leaders. But societal unease at the continuation of small wars—such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq or between poor, weak states like Ethiopia and Eritrea—should be ameliorated by the knowledge that, for the first time in history, world war is exceedingly unlikely. Determining which states are great powers is slightly more complicated, but not by much. Two decades ago, Jack Levy (1983:10) noted that the importance of the concept of “great power” was not matched by anything approaching analytical precision in its use and the field has not progressed much since. Relevant states for this analysis are those with the potential to be great powers, whether that potential is realized or not. The choice not to devote a large portion of one's national resources toward territorial defense was not available to most states in other, bygone eras. If today's rich states can choose not to prepare for war without consequence, then the nature of the system may well have changed. Broadly speaking, there is an indirect relationship between the relative level of development and the chances of being involved in a major war against a peer. In its most basic, inclusive, and falsifiable form, the obsolescence-of-major-war argument postulates that the most advanced countries—roughly speaking, those in the global north—are unlikely to fight one another ever again. Precise determination of which countries are in the “north” and which are not is less important than it may seem at first, since current versions of the argument do not restrict themselves to the great powers. As will be discussed below, if the logic behind the obsolescence-of-major-war argument is correct, a drastic diminution of all kinds of war everywhere may be on the horizon. It is important to note that this argument does not suggest that competition is coming to a conclusion, only that the means to compete have changed. Rivalry will continue; envy, hubris, and lust for power will likely never disappear. Rogues and outlaws will probably always plague humanity, but very rarely as leaders of powerful states, especially in the northern democracies. The Mueller argument merely holds that war need not follow from any of this, especially major wars. States can compete in nonviolent ways, addressing the logic of war with the grammar of commerce, to paraphrase Edward Luttwak (1990:19). The conflicts of the future may be fought in boardrooms rather than battlefields, using diplomacy, sanctions, and the methods of commerce rather than brute force. One of the obvious strengths of the obsolescence-of-major-war argument is that it carries clear routes to falsification. It can be proven incorrect by virtually any big war in Western Europe, in the Pacific Rim, or in North America. If Japan attacks Australia, if the United States moves north, or if Germany rises again and makes another thrust at Paris and Moscow, Retreat from Doomsday will join The Great Illusion (Angell [1909] 1913) in the skeptical realist's list of utopian fantasies. Until that happens, however, scholars are left to explain one of the great anomalies in the history of the international system.Most IR scholarship carries on as if such an anomaly simply does not exist. This is especially true of realists, whose theories typically leave little room for fundamental systemic change (Lebow 1994). “The game of politics does not change from age to age,” argued a skeptical Colin Gray (1999:163), “let alone from decade to decade.” Indeed, the most powerful counterargument to Mueller—and one that is ultimately unanswerable—is that this period of peace will be temporary and that someday these trends will be reversed. Neorealists traditionally contend that the anarchic structure of the system stacks the deck against long-term stability, which accounts for “war's dismal recurrence throughout the millennia,” in the words of Kenneth Waltz (1989:44). Other scholars are skeptical about the explanatory power of ideas, at least as independent variables in models of state behavior (Mearsheimer 1994/1995; Brooks and Wohlforth 2000/2001; Copeland 2003). However, one need not be convinced about the potential for ideas to transform international politics to believe that major war is extremely unlikely to recur. Mueller, Mandelbaum, Ray, and others may give primary credit for the end of major war to ideational evolution akin to that which made slavery and dueling obsolete, but others have interpreted the causal chain quite differently. Neoliberal institutionalists have long argued that complex economic interdependence can have a pacifying effect upon state behavior (Keohane and Nye 1977, 1987). Richard Rosecrance (1986, 1999) has contended that evolution in socio-economic organization has altered the shortest, most rational route to state prosperity in ways that make war unlikely. Finally, many others have argued that credit for great power peace can be given to the existence of nuclear weapons, which make aggression irrational (Jervis 1989; Kagan et al. 1999). With so many overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations, at times the end of major war may seem to be overdetermined (Jervis 2002:8–9). For purposes of the present discussion, successful identification of the exact cause of this fundamental change in state behavior is probably not as important as belief in its existence. In other words, the outcome is far more important than the mechanism. The importance of Mueller's argument for the field of IR is ultimately not dependent upon why major war has become obsolete, only that it has. Almost as significant, all these proposed explanations have one important point in common: they all imply that change will be permanent. Normative/ideational evolution is typically unidirectional—few would argue that it is likely, for instance, for slavery or dueling to return in this century. The complexity of economic interdependence is deepening as time goes on and going at a quicker pace. And, obviously, nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented and (at least at this point) no foolproof defense against their use seems to be on the horizon. The combination of forces that may have brought major war to an end seems to be unlikely to allow its return. The twentieth century witnessed an unprecedented pace of evolution in all areas of human endeavor, from science and medicine to philosophy and religion. In such an atmosphere, it is not difficult to imagine that attitudes toward the venerable institution of war may also have experienced rapid evolution and that its obsolescence could become plausible, perhaps even probable, in spite of thousands of years of violent precedent. The burden of proof would seem to be on those who maintain that the “rules of the game” of international politics, including the rules of war, are the lone area of human interaction immune to fundamental evolution and that, due to these immutable and eternal rules, war will always be with us. Rather than ask how major war could have grown obsolete, perhaps scholars should ask why anyone should believe that it could not.

## 2nc disease

**Growth causes disease spread and mutation**

**Hamburg 8—**FDA Commissioner.Senior Scientist Nuclear Threat Initiative. MD (Margaret, Germs Go Global: Why Emerging Infectious Diseases Are a Threat to America, http://healthyamericans.org/assets/files/GermsGoGlobal.pdf, AMiles)

Globalization, the worldwide movement toward economic, financial, trade, and communications integration, has impacted public health significantly. Technology and economic interdependence allow diseases to spread globally at rapid speeds. Experts believe that the increase in international travel and commerce, including the increasingly global nature of food handling, processing, and sales contribute to the spread of emerging infectious diseases.47 Increased global trade has also brought more and more people into contact with zoonosis -- diseases that originated in animals before jumping to humans. For example, in 2003, the monkeypox virus entered the U.S. through imported Gambian giant rats sold in the nation’s under-regulated exotic pet trade. The rats infected pet prairie dogs, which passed the virus along to humans.48 International smuggling of birds, brought into the U.S. without undergoing inspection and/or quarantine, is of particular concern to public health experts who worry that it may be a pathway for the H5N1 “bird flu” virus to enter the country. Lower cost and efficient means of international transportation allow people to travel to more remote places and potential exposure to more infectious diseases. And the close proximity of passengers on passenger planes, trains, and cruise ships over the course of many hours puts people at risk for higher levels of exposure. If a person contracts a disease abroad, their symptoms may not emerge until they return home, having exposed others to the infection during their travels. In addition, planes and ships can themselves become breeding grounds for infectious diseases. The 2002-2003 SARS outbreak spread quickly around the globe due to international travel. SARS is caused by a new strain of coronavirus, the same family of viruses that frequently cause the common cold. This contagious and sometimes fatal respiratory illness first appeared in China in November 2002. Within 6 weeks, SARS had spread worldwide, transmitted around the globe by unsuspecting travelers. According to CDC, 8,098 people were infected and 774 died of the disease.49 SARS represented the first severe, newly emergent infectious disease of the 21st century. 50 It illustrated just how quickly infection can spread in a highly mobile and interconnected world. SARS was contained and controlled because public health authorities in the communities most affected mounted a rapid and effective response. SARS also demonstrated the economic consequences of an emerging infectious disease in closely interdependent and highly mobile world. Apart from the direct costs of intensive medical care and disease control interventions, SARS caused widespread social disruption and economic losses. Schools, hospitals, and some borders were closed and thousands of people were placed in quarantine. International travel to affected areas fell sharply by 50 - 70 percent. Hotel occupancy dropped by more than 60 percent. Businesses, particularly in tourism-related areas, failed. According to a study by Morgan Stanley, the Asia-Pacific region’s economy lost nearly $40 billion due to SARS.51 The World Bank found that the East Asian region’s GDP fell by 2 percent in the second quarter of 2003.52 Toronto experienced a 13.4 percent drop in tourism in 2003.53

**Extinction**

**Yu 9—**Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Science (Victoria, Human Extinction: The Uncertainty of Our Fate, 22 May 2009, http://dujs.dartmouth.edu/spring-2009/human-extinction-the-uncertainty-of-our-fate, AMiles)

A pandemic will kill off all humans. In the past, humans have indeed fallen victim to viruses. Perhaps the best-known case was the bubonic plague that killed up to one third of the European population in the mid-14th century (7). While vaccines have been developed for the plague and some other infectious diseases, new viral strains are constantly emerging — a process that maintains the possibility of a pandemic-facilitated human extinction. Some surveyed students mentioned AIDS as a potential pandemic-causing virus. It is true that scientists have been unable thus far to find a sustainable cure for AIDS, mainly due to HIV’s rapid and constant evolution. Specifically, two factors account for the virus’s abnormally high mutation rate: 1. HIV’s use of reverse transcriptase, which does not have a proof-reading mechanism, and 2. the lack of an error-correction mechanism in HIV DNA polymerase (8). Luckily, though, there are certain characteristics of HIV that make it a poor candidate for a large-scale global infection: HIV can lie dormant in the human body for years without manifesting itself, and AIDS itself does not kill directly, but rather through the weakening of the immune system. However, for more easily transmitted viruses such as influenza, the evolution of new strains could prove far more consequential. The simultaneous occurrence of antigenic drift (point mutations that lead to new strains) and antigenic shift (the inter-species transfer of disease) in the influenza virus could produce a new version of influenza for which scientists may not immediately find a cure. Since influenza can spread quickly, this lag time could potentially lead to a “global influenza pandemic,” according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (9). The most recent scare of this variety came in 1918 when bird flu managed to kill over 50 million people around the world in what is sometimes referred to as the Spanish flu pandemic. Perhaps even more frightening is the fact that only 25 mutations were required to convert the original viral strain — which could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain (10).

## Trade

### Failed States

**Countless factors check collapse**

**Grayson, 10**

George W. Grayson, Class of 1938 Professor of Government at the College of William & Mary senior associate at CSIS, an associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a member of the board of advisers of the Latin American Advisor, and senior adviser on Mexican affairs for the Washington-based Capital Insights Group, having made more than 125 research trips to Mexico; “Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?”, 2010, pg. 272 //bghs-ms

Only a Cassandra in deep funk could conclude that Mexico will implode as is possible in Afghanistan or Pakistan. There are too many factors – the Mexican armed forces, the Roman Catholic church, the middle class, the Monterrey business community, the banking system, labor and professional organisations, the U.S government, and international financial institutions [IMF,World Bank], etc.- to let this happen. Felipe Calderon and his successors must act to prevent ungovernability in cities like Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana, and in states like Guerrero, Durango, Sinaloa, and Michoacan.

**Mexico isn’t on the verge of collapse**

**Al Jazeera, 12**

“Mexico: Failed state or economic giant?”, 10/3/2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/thecafe/2012/09/20129161631565644.html //bghs-ms

Kidnappings, torture and beheadings - the so-called war on drugs has ravaged Mexico for years. With 60,000 dead, and counting, some say that America’s southern neighbour is on the verge of becoming a failed state. But as record foreign direct investment pours into the country and the economy keeps growing, there is also another side to Mexico. In this country, headlines about the world’s richest man, becoming a top ten global economy and being the seventh largest oil producer compete with grisly news of journalists killed or dead bodies dumped from Ciudad Juarez to Acapulco.

### Protectionism

#### No motive for protectionism

**Lamont 10** (James, Geithner vows to block protectionism, 7 April 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/370f8d52-421b-11df-9ac4-00144feabdc0.html, AMiles)

Tim Geithner, US Treasury secretary, said during a two-day visit to India that protectionist measures to prevent jobs from migrating outside the country would do more harm to the US than good. “We are not going to go down that path,” promised Mr Geithner. “We know that it would make us weaker, not stronger.” He also said that the administration of Barack Obama, president, would not seek to curb the investments of US companies overseas as “our fortunes are tied with the world”. There have been proposals to trim the tax privileges of US companies that operate internationally. “American companies are long in the world,” Mr Geithner told Indian business leaders at a discussion hosted by the Confederation of Indian Industry. “They are good at what much of the world needs. A huge part of the basic economic challenge we face is to give stronger in- centive for private investment, help support innovation and try to make sure there is more investment and stronger exports globally.” Mr Geithner said Mr Obama was “deeply committed” to trying to build a consensus among Americans for more open trade to support the recovery. “We have got the worst labour market since the Great Depression,” the Treasury secretary said. “Most Americans are still going through an incredibly difficult economic series of challenges and yet we’ve been very successful in working to keep our markets open under all that pressure.”

## Security

### A-priori for policy debate – it’s the fundamental political question

Reus-Smit 12– Professor of International Relations at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy (Christian, “International Relations, Irrelevant? Don’t Blame Theory”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies June 2012 vol. 40 no. 3 525-540,)

However widespread it might be, the notion that IR’s lack of practical relevance stems from excessive theorising rests more on vigorous assertion than weighty evidence. As noted above, we lack good data on the field’s practical relevance, and the difficulties establishing appropriate measures are all too apparent in the fraught attempts by several governments to quantify the impact of the humanities and social sciences more generally. Beyond this, though, we lack any credible evidence that any fluctuations in the field’s relevance are due to more or less high theory. We hear that policymakers complain of not being able to understand or apply much that appears in our leading journals, but it is unclear why we should be any more concerned about this than physicists or economists, who take theory, even high theory, to be the bedrock of advancement in knowledge. Moreover, there is now a wealth of research, inside and outside IR, that shows that policy communities are not open epistemic or cognitive realms, simply awaiting well-communicated, non-jargonistic knowledge – they are bureaucracies, deeply susceptible to groupthink, that filter information through their own intersubjective frames. 10 Beyond this, however, there are good reasons to believe that precisely the reverse of the theory versus relevance thesis might be true; that theoretical inquiry may be a necessary prerequisite for the generation of practically relevant knowledge. I will focus here on the value of metatheory, as this attracts most contemporary criticism and would appear the most difficult of theoretical forms to defend. Metatheories take other theories as their subject. Indeed, their precepts establish the conditions of possibility for second-order theories. In general, metatheories divide into three broad categories: epistemology, ontology and meta-ethics. The first concerns the nature, validity and acquisition of knowledge; the second, the nature of being (what can be said to exist, how things might be categorised and how they stand in relation to one another); and the third, the nature of right and wrong, what constitutes moral argument, and how moral arguments might be sustained. Second-order theories are constructed within, and on the basis of, assumptions formulated at the metatheoretical level. Epistemological assumptions about what constitutes legitimate knowledge and how it is legitimately acquired delimit the questions we ask and the kinds of information we can enlist in answering them. 11 Can social scientists ask normative questions? Is literature a valid source of social-scientific knowledge? Ontological assumptions about the nature and distinctiveness of the social universe affect not only what we ‘see’ but also how we order what we see; how we relate the material to the ideational, agents to structures, interests to beliefs, and so on. If we assume, for example, that individuals are rational actors, engaged in the efficient pursuit of primarily material interests, then phenomena such as faith-motivated politics will remain at the far periphery of our vision. 12 Lastly, meta-ethical assumptions about the nature of the good, and about what constitutes a valid moral argument, frame how we reason about concrete ethical problems. Both deontology and consequentialism are meta-ethical positions, operationalised, for example, in the differing arguments of Charles Beitz and Peter Singer on global distributive justice. 13 Most scholars would acknowledge the background, structuring role that metatheory plays, but argue that we can take our metatheoretical assumptions off the shelf, get on with the serious business of research and leave explicit metatheoretical reflection and debate to the philosophers. If practical relevance is one of our concerns, however, there are several reasons why this is misguided. Firstly, whether IR is practically relevant depends, in large measure, on the kinds of questions that animate our research. I am not referring here to the commonly held notion that we should be addressing questions that practitioners want answered. Indeed, our work will at times be most relevant when we pursue questions that policymakers and others would prefer left buried. My point is a different one, which I return to in greater detail below. It is sufficient to note here that being practically relevant involves asking questions of practice; not just retrospective questions about past practices – their nature, sources and consequences – but prospective questions about what human agents should do. As I have argued elsewhere, being practically relevant means asking questions of how we, ourselves, or some other actors (states, policymakers, citizens, NGOs, IOs, etc.) should act. 14 Yet our ability, nay willingness, to ask such questions is determined by the metatheoretical assumptions that structure our research and arguments. This is partly an issue of ontology – what we see affects how we understand the conditions of action, rendering some practices possible or impossible, mandatory or beyond the pale. If, for example, we think that political change is driven by material forces, then we are unlikely to see communicative practices of argument and persuasion as potentially successful sources of change. More than this, though, it is also an issue of epistemology. If we assume that the proper domain of IR as a social science is the acquisition of empirically verifiable knowledge, then we will struggle to comprehend, let alone answer, normative questions of how we should act. We will either reduce ‘ought’ questions to ‘is’ questions, or place them off the agenda altogether. 15 Our metatheoretical assumptions thus determine the macro-orientation of IR towards questions of practice, directly affecting the field’s practical relevance**.** Secondly, metatheoretical revolutions license new second-order theoretical and analytical possibilities while foreclosing others, directly affecting those forms of scholarship widely considered most practically relevant. The rise of analytical eclecticism illustrates this. As noted above, Katzenstein and Sil’s call for a pragmatic approach to the study of world politics, one that addresses real-world problematics by combining insights from diverse research traditions, resonates with the mood of much of the field, especially within the American mainstream. Epistemological and ontological debates are widely considered irresolvable dead ends, grand theorising is unfashionable, and gladiatorial contests between rival paradigms appear, increasingly, as unimaginative rituals. Boredom and fatigue are partly responsible for this new mood, but something deeper is at work. Twenty-five years ago, Sil and Katzenstein’s call would have fallen on deaf ears; the neo-neo debate that preoccupied the American mainstream occurred within a metatheoretical consensus, one that combined a neo-positivist epistemology with a rationalist ontology. This singular metatheoretical framework defined the rules of the game; analytical eclecticism was unimaginable. The Third Debate of the 1980s and early 1990s destabilised all of this; not because American IR scholars converted in their droves to critical theory or poststructuralism (far from it), but because metatheoretical absolutism became less and less tenable. The anti-foundationalist critique of the idea that there is any single measure of truth did not produce a wave of relativism, but it did generate a widespread sense that battles on the terrain of epistemology were unwinnable. Similarly, the Third Debate emphasis on identity politics and cultural particularity, which later found expression in constructivism, did not vanquish rationalism. It did, however, establish a more pluralistic, if nevertheless heated, debate about ontology, a terrain on which many scholars felt more comfortable than that of epistemology. One can plausibly argue, therefore, that the metatheoretical struggles of the Third Debate created a space for – even made possible – the rise of analytical eclecticism and its aversion to metatheoretical absolutes, a principal benefit of which is said to be greater practical relevance. Lastly, most of us would agree that for our research to be practically relevant, it has to be good – it has to be the product of sound inquiry, and our conclusions have to be plausible. The pluralists among us would also agree that different research questions require different methods of inquiry and strategies of argument. Yet across this diversity there are several practices widely recognised as essential to good research. Among these are clarity of purpose, logical coherence, engagement with alternative arguments and the provision of good reasons (empirical evidence, corroborating arguments textual interpretations, etc.). Less often noted, however, is the importance of metatheoretical reflexivity. If our epistemological assumptions affect the questions we ask, then being conscious of these assumptions is necessary to ensure that we are not fencing off questions of importance, and that if we are, we can justify our choices. Likewise, if our ontological assumptions affect how we see the social universe, determining what is in or outside our field of vision, then reflecting on these assumptions can prevent us being blind to things that matter. A similar argument applies to our meta-ethical assumptions. Indeed, if deontology and consequentialism are both meta-ethical positions, as I suggested earlier, then reflecting on our choice of one or other position is part and parcel of weighing rival ethical arguments (on issues as diverse as global poverty and human rights). Finally, our epistemological, ontological and meta-ethical assumptions are not metatheoretical silos; assumptions we make in one have a tendency to shape those we make in another. The oft-heard refrain that ‘if we can’t measure it, it doesn’t matter’ is an unfortunate example of epistemology supervening on ontology, something that metatheoretical reflexivity can help guard against. In sum, like clarity, coherence, consideration of alternative arguments and the provision of good reasons, metatheoretical reflexivity is part of keeping us honest, making it practically relevant despite its abstraction.

### Vote neg to refrain from the basic terms of reference – only critique solves

Graeme Cheeseman, Snr. Lecturer @ New South Wales, and Robert Bruce, ‘96 (Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)KENTUCKY

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. I IT challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she (THEY ARE) is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates , or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

### Prefer our turn a constructivist approach to deterrence is necessary to solve – Moore’s explanation overlooks systemic causes which makes conflict more likely

Goodman 5 – Harvard Law School 2005, Ryan American Journal of International Law, Lexis

John Norton Moore’s Solving the War Puzzle raises important issues for fashioning institutions to prevent war. The book presents a detailed argument supporting two strategies—democracy promotion and deterrence. Moor highlights the proper analytic question: what mechanisms motivate states to initiate war? As a methodological matter, Moore does well to ground this inquiry in empirical evidence. He ultimately proposes an “incentive theory,” in which the political and material self-interest of governmental leaders is central to an account of the causes of war. This explanation, however, involves an unduly restrictive view of the reasons for which states wage war. The theory provides a thin conception of human motivation. The theory neither adequately explains the behavioral regularities that Moore identifies nor accounts for other patterns of international armed conflict. Contrary to Moore’s analysis, an array of recent theoretical and empirical studies—some of which are used by Moore, and some not—suggests the potential significance of mechanisms that are not grounded in incentives.  Identifying these mechanisms is essential to designing a coherent and effective international regime. Each mechanism supports democracy promotion (albeit for different reasons), yet some may conflict with particular deterrence-based strategies. At a fundamental level, each mechanism suggests distinct, and often competing, views of how to influence states. Consequently, strategies that exploit one mechanism can stfile the effects of another. Thus, while Moore’s general approach is commendable, the broader empirical literature and competing conceptual models pose considerable challenges to his theoretical claims and policy prescriptions.  Until the mechanisms, and relationships between them, are better understood, we are unlikely to approach a solution to the war puzzle. Indeed, institutions and actors that pay inadequate attention to these dynamics may hamper, rather than enhance, the prospects of peace.

1. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded that the observed global warming since the mid-20th century was very likely to have been caused by rising anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations (IPCC 2007a). Despite the media hype of the so-called “climate gate” (caused by the leak of the emails stolen from the Climate Research Unit at the British University of East Anglia), none of the basic scientific facts concerning climate change was challenged. See the open letter by 255 leading scientists on the issue (Guardian 2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)